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COMMENT
Antitrust in Amateur Athletics: Fourth and Long: Why
Non-BCS Universities Should Punt Rather Than Go For an
Antitrust Challenge to the Bowl Championship Series*
L Introduction
Against the backdrop of bowl game traditions and several failed attempts
to pair the top two teams in a championship game, the Bowl Championship
Series (BCS) emerged in 1998 to address college football fans' deep-seated
frustration with the lack of a true national championship game.' The BCS
arrangement encompasses four2 bowl games whose participants are primarily
selected from sixty-three universities within certain conferences,3 leaving the
* The author would like to thank Dean Andrew M. Coats, C. Brent Dishman, and
Professors D. Kent Meyers, Mary Margaret Penrose, and Carrie Sperling for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts. The author would also like to dedicate this comment in memory of
her father, Gary Warmbrod, who loved college football.
1. See Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl
Championship Series: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10
(2003) (testimony of Jim Delany, Commissioner, Big Ten Conference) [hereinafter Delany
House Testimony] (noting that the BCS was created in 1998 to strengthen the bowl system);
Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl Championship
Series: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 11 (2003) (statement
of Jim Delany, Commissioner, Big Ten Conference) [hereinafter Delany House Statement]
(arguing that without the BCS, college football fans would have been denied a true national
championship game under the previous bowl game structure of conference-bowl relationships).
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) does not sponsor a Division I-A national
championship in college football. See infra Parts U.A-B.
2. The BCS recently added a fifth BCS bowl game to its postseason structure; the new
structure will go into effect after the 2006 regular season. Calvin Watkins, As Expected, BCS
Adds Bowl - Planned Fifth Game Would Rotate Between Four Current Sites, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 11, 2004, at 10C. This change to the BCS will not alter the current bowl
locations, with the Fiesta, Orange, Rose, and Sugar Bowls continuing to host the BCS bowl
games. Id. Under the new format, each of the four BCS bowls will host two games once every
four years, with the first game being its regular game and the second game being the national
title game. Id.; see also Mark Alesia, TV Will Get Final Say on New BCS Lineup: Major Bowls
Will Host Extra Game Once Every Four Years, Title Game Is One Week Later, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, June 11, 2004, at ID (noting that the current changes to the BCS system happened after
the non-BCS schools formed a coalition and threatened an antitrust lawsuit).
3. See BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES: BCS BOWL ELIGIBILITY, at http://www.bcsfootball.
org/index.cfm?page=eligibility (last visited Aug. 30, 2004) [hereinafter BCS BOWLELIGIBILITY]
(noting that the conference champions of the BCS conferences - Atlantic Coast Conference
(ACC), Big East Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big Twelve Conference (Big 12), Pacific-10
Conference (Pac-10), and Southeastern Conference (SEC) - have guaranteed berths to BCS
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other fifty-four universities in Division I-A without the opportunity to compete
for the BCS-proclaimed national title.4 BCS membership advantages,
however, extend beyond determining a national champion. BCS universities
automatically qualify for the most sought after bowl games,5 which are
accompanied by lucrative television contracts with the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC).6 Moreover, BCS perks translate into financial, competitive,
and branding benefits7 for the BCS member schools - benefits that have
drawn attention and concern from the U.S. Congress.8
Non-BCS universities - the "have-nots" of college football 9 - have
increasingly cried foul and are ready to challenge the BCS arrangement with
an antitrust lawsuit.'" These universities contend that the BCS fails to provide
bowls, thus filling six of the eight slots in the four BCS bowl games).
4. See Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl
Championship Series: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 19
(2003) (statement of Scott S. Cowen, President, Tulane University) [hereinafter Cowen House
Statement] (remarking that the BCS arrangement has created a "system of limited access" in
Division I-A college football).
5. See supra note 3 (noting that the six BCS conference champions automatically qualify
for positions in BCS bowl games).
6. BCS or Bust: Competitive and Economic Effects of the Bowl Championship Series On
and Off the Field: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16 (2003)
(statement of Scott S. Cowen, President, Tulane University) [hereinafter Cowen Senate
Statement].
7. See infra Part H.F.
8. See Chris Dufresne, Senate Probes BCS Format - Biden Says System "Looks Un-
American;" Tulane President Says It Represents a Monopoly, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30,2003, at D8
(quoting Sen. Joe Biden calling the BCS "un-American"). See generally BCS or Bust:
Competitive and Economic Effects of the Bowl Championship Series On and Off the Field:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (commenting that the current BCS system calls
basic fairness into question); Competition in College Athletic Conferences andAntitrustAspects
of the Bowl Championship Series: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Rep. James F. Sensenbrener, Chairman, House Comm. on the
Judiciary) (explaining that there are allegations that the current BCS system violates federal
antitrust law); Antitrust Implications of the College Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Sen. Mike DeWine, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Business Rights and Competition) (commenting that the "[Bowl] Alliance raises antitrust and
competitive concerns that need to be examined").
9. Joe Drape, B.C.S. andNon-B.C.S. Teams Not So Different, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,2003,
at D7 (calling non-BCS schools the "have-nots" of college football). Non-BCS conferences
include Conference USA, Mid-American Conference, Mountain West Conference, Sun Belt
Conference, and Western Athletic Conference. Cowen House Statement, supra note 4, at 19.
10. Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl




all Division I-A programs with equal access to postseason opportunities,
resulting in a system that stifles competition and runs contrary to federal
antitrust law." The "haves," or those conferences and schools belonging to
the BCS, 12 argue that the system does not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act 3
but rewards those universities with the winningest traditions in college
football. 
14
Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff has threatened to request that the
Antitrust Committee of the National Association of Attorneys General
conduct a formal investigation to determine whether the BCS arrangement
restrains competition or harms consumers of college football.' 5 Moreover,
several sports writers and commentators support the non-BCS schools'
contention that the BCS violates federal antitrust law.' 6 In this impending
legal battle of big dogs and underdogs, this comment analyzes whether a
viable antitrust claim against the BCS exists or if non-BCS schools should
simply recognize and accept their place in the college football hierarchy. This
comment concludes that non-BCS conferences and universities have confused
(2003) (testimony of Scott S. Cowen, President, Tulane University, and Chairman, Presidential
Coalition for Athletics Reform) [hereinafter Cowen House Testimony] (commenting that
consultations with antitrust legal counsel reveal that the BCS agreement is "vulnerable to
violation of [the] antitrust laws if contested").
11. Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl
Championship Series: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 29
(2003) (testimony of Steve Young, NFL Super Bowl Championship Quarterback, and Former
Division I-A College Football Player) [hereinafter Young House Testimony].
12. Cowen House Statement, supra note 4, at 25 (showing that the BCS includes the ACC,
Big 12, Big East Conference, Big Ten Conference, Pac-10, SEC, and independent University
of Notre Dame); Drape, supra note 9 (referring to BCS schools and conferences as the "haves"
of college football).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
14. See Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that the BCS revenue structure
rewards those teams that predominately played in major bowl games before the formation of the
BCS).
15. Joe Drape, B.C.S. To Explore a More Inclusive System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at
D4.
16. Interview: Christine Brennan Discusses the Various College Bowl Games (National
Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 2, 2004). When asked whether the BCS would pass muster under
antitrust laws if college football was in any other industry, Ms. Brennan replied "[pirobably not"
and commented that the BCS "may not even pass [the antitrust laws] in this industry." Id.; see
Tim Layden, Better Bowls: The BCS May Never Be Perfect, but College Football Can Improve
(Oct. 17, 2003), at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/writersltimilaydenll0/17insider
index.html (referring to Congress's involvement in the legality of the BCS and commenting that
"while there's little doubt that the bowl system - under any name - flouts antitrust laws, it
seemed that the government needn't worry about it").
2004]
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athletic competition with economic competition, and that, although the time
may have come to sideline the BCS system, the "have-nots" will not achieve
victory through an antitrust lawsuit.
Part RI of this comment tracks the history of the college football bowl
system and the evolution of the BCS. Part 111 provides a brief introduction to
the Sherman Antitrust Act and illustrates how college football and the BCS
fall within the scope of the Act. Part IV uses the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma 7 to
illustrate the analysis that courts employ to determine unreasonable restraints
of trade in college athletics. Finally, Part V demonstrates how a potential
BCS antitrust claim would confuse athletic and economic competition and
why a court would likely reject an antitrust challenge by non-BCS institutions
against the BCS.
II. Who's No. 1 ? The History of Postseason College Football
Bowl games are inescapably tied to college football's beginnings. Until the
BCS began in 1998, however, no mechanism existed within the bowl game
structure to determine one national champion." The BCS ingeniously
capitalized on this apparent flaw by pairing the historically powerful football
conferences with the most coveted bowl games.
A. The Evolution of Bowl Games
Bowl games existed over a century before the BCS. In 1894, Amos
"Alonzo" Stagg invited the University of Notre Dame to play the University
of Chicago in the first bowl game.'9 Shortly thereafter, other universities
joined the bowl game phenomenon, including the University of Michigan and
Stanford University, who played the first Rose Bowl game in 1902.20 The
17. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
18. See Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 11-13 (noting that bowl and conference
affiliations were a step toward providing a national championship game for college football
fans).
19. Antitrust Implications of the College Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41 (1997)
(statement of Cedric W. Dempsey, Executive Director, NCAA) [hereinafter Dempsey Senate
Statement].
20. Id. at 43 (noting that the first bowl games were anything but regular in postseason play).
The second Rose Bowl game took place fourteen years later when Washington State University
played Brown University. Id. Postseason play picked up during the Great Depression. There
are estimates that over 100 postseason games were played nationwide to raise relief funds for
the unemployed in response to U.S. President Herbert Hoover's Committee on Mobilization of




bowl game tradition continued with the addition of the Orange, Sugar, Sun,
and Cotton Bowls in the 1930s, as cities and universities realized the potential
economic impact of bowl games and dedicated football fans.2 ' Since then, the
number of bowl games has increased. Currently, twenty-eight bowl games
provide fifty-six Division I-A universities with an opportunity for postseason
play.
22
As bowl games became the status quo for postseason play, several
conferences developed relationships with certain bowls to ensure the
conferences' respective champions a berth in postseason play. The Big Eight
Conference, now known as the Big Twelve (Big 12) Conference,23 which
includes both the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University,
24
cultivated a close relationship with the Orange Bowl and sent its annual
conference champion to Miami, Florida. Other conferences established
similar relationships, such as the Big Ten and Pacific Ten (Pac-10) champions
securing an exclusive agreement to compete in the Rose Bowl each year.26
While these relationships ensured certain conference champions a bowl game,
they often prevented the best teams in the country from meeting in a national
21. See id. at 44 (stating that the Orange and Sugar Bowls started in 1935, the Sun Bowl
in 1936, and the Cotton Bowl in 1937). Currently, the Orange Bowl is played in Miami,
Florida, the Sugar Bowl in New Orleans, Louisiana, the Sun Bowl in El Paso, Texas, and the
Cotton Bowl in Dallas, Texas. 2003-2004 COLLEGE BOWL RESULTS, at http://football.about.
concs/bowlgames/a/bl_2003bowls.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 2003-2004
COLLEGE BOWL RESULTS].
22. BCS or Bust: Competitive and Economic Effects of the Bowl Championship Series On
and Off the Field: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 17 (2003)
(statement of Keith R. Tribble, Chairman, Football Bowl Association) [hereinafter Tribble
Senate Statement].
23. USA FOOTBALL, HISTORY OFCOLLEGIATE FOOTBALL, at http://www.usafootball.com
aboutthesport/collegiate.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
24. Id. The Big 12 Conference grew out of the Missouri Valley Intercollegiate Athletic
Association (MVIAA), which formed in 1907. Id. In 1920, MVIAA admitted Oklahoma, and
Oklahoma State joined in 1925. Id. In 1928, six of the seven institutions (excluding Oklahoma
State) formally organized a separate conference that became known as the Big Six. Id. The
league membership grew when Colorado and Oklahoma State joined the conference. Id. In
1968, the conference officially changed its title from MVIAA to the Big Eight Conference. Id.
Finally, in 1996, the conference was renamed the Big 12 after the conference added Baylor,
Texas, Texas A&M, and Texas Tech. Id.
25. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 12.
26. Id. (also noting that the SEC developed a longstanding relationship with the Sugar
Bowl, and the former Southwest Conference sent its champion to the Cotton Bowl in Dallas,
Texas).
20041
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championship game.27 Consequently, the top two teams each year met only
occasionally, and when they did, it was by mere chance.2"
Because of the happenstance nature of a national championship game and
the lack of a playoff mechanism to determine an undisputed national
champion, Division I-A college football has historically relied on voting by
selected members of the college football community to determine its national
champion. Under this system, the Associated Press Poll and Coaches Poll
each select a national champion.29 This imperfect and highly subjective
system has resulted in the crowning of two teams as national champions on
27. See infra notes 28-31, 75-86 and accompanying text.
28. Delany House Testimony, supra note 1, at 10 (illustrating that before the first attempt
to develop a bowl alliance, the conference bowl system paired the number one and two teams
against each other only nine times in forty-five years).
Another interesting example of the irregularity in national championship games occurred in
1969 when U.S. President Richard M. Nixon declared the Division I-A national champion
before postseason bowl play ever took place. See Pete Fiutak, College Football's 100 Greatest
Games: Texas v. Arkansas, 1969, COLLEGE FOOTBALL NEWS, at http://www.collegefootball
news.comrlop_100_Games/Top_100_Games_5.htm(last visited Aug. 30, 2004). On December
6, 1969, President Nixon attended the Arkansas-Texas regular season game intending to declare
the winner of the game national champion. Id. At the time, the polls ranked Texas first and
Arkansas second. Id. After Texas's 15-14 victory, President Nixon named Texas the national
champion. Id.
29. See COLLEGE FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE (RECOGNIZED NATIONAL CHAMPIONSHIPS
BY YEAR), at http://www.cfbdatawarehouse.com/datanational-championships/nchamps-year.
php (last visited Aug. 30,2004) [hereinafter COLLEGE FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE] (showing
the year each selector poll named a college football team national champion). Active since
1936, the Associated Press Poll is the oldest poll. Id. at http://www.cfbdatawarehouse.com/
data/national-championships. The Coaches Poll has existed since 1950. Id. The Coaches Poll
has used different sources to report its poll over the years. Id. From 1958 through 1990, the
Coaches Poll used United Press International (UPI). Id. From 1991 through 1996, USA
Today/CNN reported the Coaches Poll selection. Id. The Coaches Poll has used USA
Today/ESPN from 1997 to the present. Id.
With the BCS, both the Associated Press and Coaches Polls continue to select a Division
I-A national champion. Id. at http://www.cfbdatawarehouse.com/data/national_championships/
year_byyear.php. However, under the current BCS contract, which expires after the 2005
season, the Coaches Poll is obligated by contract to declare the winner of the BCS title game
the national champion. Chris Dufresne, Coaches Backed into a Corner: An AgreementRequires
That They Vote the Winner of BCS Title Game No. 1, but Some Are Asking If They Can Keep
USC at the Top, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at D1. The Associated Press Poll, however, may
name another team national champion. Id. For example, after the 2003 season, the Associated
Press Poll named the University of Southern California national champion, while the Coaches
Poll selected the winner of the BCS title game, Louisiana State University, national champion.





more than one occasion.3" The BCS appeared to resolve the problem of dual
champions until the 2003 season when the Associated Press Poll and Coaches
Poll selected different teams as national champion. 3' Thus, even with the BCS
in place, the importance of the human polls has not diminished. In fact, recent
changes to the BCS illustrate that the polls retain a substantial roll in deciding
which teams play in the BCS-proclaimed national championship game.
32
Critics of the human polls describe Division I-A college football as unique
when compared to other intercollegiate athletics "because the National
Championship is not decided by playing on the field, but rather by lobbying
for the most votes in the two most recognizable 'polls.' 3
3 Despite its critics,
however, human polls are justified in a nonplayoff system as long as the
coaches and media vote based on the teams' performance on the field, rather
than subjective factors such as large fan bases and high profile coaches.
Unfortunately, the system of having human polls name the national champion
is neither the only peculiarity, nor critics only concern, in Division I-A college
football.
30. See COLLEGE FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE, supra note 29 (illustrating when the
various polls selected more than one college football team as national champion).
The 1970's were plagued with dual champions. See id. In 1970, both Nebraska (Associated
Press) and Texas (United Press International Coaches Poll) were named champions. See id.
This occurred again in 1973 and 1974, when both Alabama and Notre Dame were selected in
1973, and Oklahoma and the University of Southern California were picked in 1974. See id.
The Associated Press and the United Press International Coaches Polls named the University
of Colorado and Georgia Tech respectively as national champions in 1990. See id. In 1991,
Miami (Florida) and Washington were both selected by the Associated Press and USA
Today/ESPN Coaches Polls respectively. See id. Before the creation of the BCS, the most
recent example was 1997, when Michigan and Nebraska were both selected as number one by
the Associated Press and the USA Today/ESPN Coaches Polls respectively. See id.; see also
MYTHICAL NATIONAL COLLEGE FOOTBALL CHAMPIONS, at http://www.cae.wisc.edu/-dwilson
/rsfc/history/la.champs.txt (last visited Aug. 30, 2004) (giving the year and the name of the
college recognized as national champion). But see Dodds, supra note 29 (noting that after the
2003 season, the Associated Press Poll named the University of Southern California national
champion, while the Coaches Poll named Louisiana State University national champion).
However, 2003 is the only year there has been a split national champion since the advent of the
BCS. See COLLEGE FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE, supra note 29.
31. See Brian Davis, New BCS Formula: Just Win, Baby, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
28, 2004, at 40G (noting that the Associated Press Poll voted University of Southern California
national champion, while the Coaches Poll selected Louisiana State University national
champion).
32. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
33. K. Todd Wallace, Elite Domination of College Football: An Analysis of the Antitrust
Implications of the Bowl Alliance, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 57, 59 (1999).
2004]
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B. The Unconventional Role of the NCAA in Division I-A Postseason Play
In the eyes of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the
BCS and non-BCS label does not matter because these schools are all Division
I-A universities.34 When compared to other intercollegiate athletics, including
other divisions of college football, however, the postseason bowl system is
unique to Division I-A." Senator Mitch McConnell contrasted the BCS with
college basketball's national championships, a sixty-four-team tournament
open to qualifying NCAA Division I-A schools, which is commonly referred
to as March Madness. 6 According to Senator McConnell's analogy, unlike
March Madness, which is a relatively fair and open competition, the Elite
Eight and Final Four of college football are essentially determined before the
start of the season.37 Sports Illustrated writer David Vecsey also noted the
discrepancy between NCAA's treatment of Division I-A college football and
NCAA basketball:
The irony of the NCAA is how differently it approaches its two
biggest national championships. Football is a members only elitist
affair, while basketball is a model of democracy in which the best
teams in the nation have to accept the challenge of all comers ....
[In college basketball] [e]ventually some of those Cinderellas, say
a Gonzaga, transform themselves into accepted members of high
society. In football, however, that can't happen because it's a
given fact that certain programs won't ever compete for a national
title. Not because they can't, but because they aren't allowed to.3"
No playoff system has ever existed for Division I-A college football,39
which is contrary to other sports governed by the NCAA.40 The NCAA
34. John Klein, Slices of BCS Pie Are Inequitable, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 3, 2003, at B 1.
35. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984) (Bd. of Regents II1)
(commenting that the NCAA has sponsored and conducted national championships in some
sports, such as baseball, swimming, basketball, wrestling, and track, but not in football); see
also Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl
Championship Series: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5-6
(2003) (testimony of Myles Brand, President, NCAA) [hereinafter Brand House Testimony].
36. Antitrust Implications of the College Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 9-10
(1997) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell) [hereinafter McConnell Senate Statement].
37. Id. at 9.
38. David Vecsey, BCS Delights as Frogs Croak(Nov. 21,2003), at http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/2003/writers/david.vecsey/1 1/2 l/tcu.bcs/index.html.
39. Brand House Testimony, supra note 35, at 5-6.
40. The NCAA is a voluntary organization composed of 1260 colleges, universities, athletic




conducts, organizes, and oversees the national championships of every
intercollegiate team sport except for Division I-A football.4 ' In fact, the
NCAA conducts eighty-nine national championships in twenty-three sports,
including football playoffs in Division I-AA, Division II, and Division 111. 42
In addition to the NCAA's role of governance over all intercollegiate
athletics,43 the NCAA's relationship with the BCS consists of ensuring
compliance with NCAA playing rules and administering, governing, and
certifying bowl games.44 The BCS participants are NCAA members, but each
bowl game constitutes a private entity independent of the NCAA.45 In
essence, although the NCAA does not administer the Division I-A college
football national championship, the NCAA maintains a "cooperative
relationship," albeit not a legally binding arrangement, with the BCS.4
The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma best explains the motivation behind the NCAA's
disparate treatment. NCAA President Myles Brand testified before the House
initiated the discussions for the creation of an entity to govern intercollegiate sports after
numerous injuries and deaths had resulted from college football, prompting many institutions
to discontinue the sport. Dempsey Senate Statement, supra note 19, at 43. Sixty-two members
founded the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS), which was
officially created March 31, 1906. HISTORY OF THE NCAA, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/
history.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2004). In 1910, the IAAUS changed its name to the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Id. Ironically, college football spearheaded the
formation of the NCAA, yet Division I-A college football is the only team sport for which the
NCAA does not determine the national champion.
41. NCAA ONLINE, at http://www.ncaa.org/sportsfrontF.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
Division I-A football is the only team sport where the NCAA does not conduct the national
championship. See id.
42. Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl
Championship Series: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7
(2003) (statement of Myles Brand, President, NCAA) [hereinafter Brand House Statement]; see
CHAMPIONSHIP INFORMATION - NCAA SPORTS.COM, at http://www.ncaasports.com/football/
mens/championship-info (last visited Aug. 30, 2004) (containing championship information on
Divisions I-AA, II, and III but omitting Division I-A from NCAA football championship
information).
43. Brand House Statement, supra note 42, at 7 (noting that the "NCAA serves as the
governance and administrative infrastructure through which representatives of colleges and
universities enact legislation and set policy to establish recruiting standards and competitive
equity among members, protect the integrity of intercollegiate athletics, ensure the enforcement
of its rules and provide public advocacy of college sports").
44. Id. at 8.
45. Dempsey Senate Statement, supra note 19, at 45 (referring to the Bowl Alliance, the
predecessor to the BCS).
46. Id. at 44 (referring to the NCAA relationship with the Bowl Alliance, which has now
evolved to the BCS).
2004]
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Judiciary Committee Hearing on the BCS that the NCAA's involvement in
Division I-A football was "significantly diminished ...when the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled the NCAA's regular season television contract a
violation of [the] Sherman [A]ntitrust [Act]. 47 Board of Regents altered the
relationship between Division I-A college football and the NCAA when the
Court held that the NCAA television plan restrained trade by restricting the
right of any university to enter into its own television contract outside of the
NCAA-established television plan.48  Whether the NCAA's lack of
involvement and trivial presence in the largest division of college football 49
stems from the fear of a future lawsuit is unclear. However, what is clear is
that Board of Regents' monumental holding not only changed the NCAA's
hands-on approach to Division I-A college football, but also provides direction
in analyzing a potential antitrust suit against the BCS.5°
Aside from the Supreme Court's decision in Board ofRegents, the NCAA's
minor involvement in Division I-A college football may also be attributed to
the lack of support within Division I-A for an NCAA-sponsored playoff. As
early as 1976, NCAA delegates introduced recommendations and proposals
to establish a Division I-A football playoff similar to other NCAA-governed
playoffs.5' The 1976 playoff proposal, however, never came to a vote and was
withdrawn for lack of support.52 In 1988, an overwhelming majority of the
NCAA delegates adopted a resolution indicating that Division I-A
membership did not support a football playoff.53 Nevertheless, a special
committee selected to study the feasibility of an NCAA-run national
championship revisited the issue again in 1994.' The committee decided not
to recommend legislation to the NCAA Presidents Commission, even though
the committee found merit to the concept of a playoff.55 No playoff proposal
47. Brand House Testimony, supra note 35, at 6 (referring to NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
48. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,98 (1984) (Bd. of Regents III).
49. See Brand House Testimony, supra note 35, at 5 (noting that Division I-A institutions
are those schools with the broadest financial conmmitment to athletics); NCAA MEMBERSHIP
BREAKDOWN, COMPOSIONOFTHENCAA, athttp:llwwwl .ncaa.org/membership/membership-
svcs/membershipbreakdown.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2004) (showing that Division I-A has
148,614 student-athletes out of the 361,175 total student-athletes in Divisions I, H, and MI).
50. See infra Parts IV, V.
51. Brand House Statement, supra note 42, at 7.
52. Dempsey Senate Statement, supra note 19, at 44 (noting that there was no discussion
of the idea on the NCAA convention floor).
53. Brand House Statement, supra note 42, at 8.
54. Dempsey Senate Statement, supra note 19, at 42, 44.




resulted, even after the panel forwarded the report to university presidents. 6
Thus, despite several opportunities to give the NCAA authority to conduct a
national championship in college football, Division I-A universities have
failed to adopt a playoff proposal. 7
Proponents of the bowl game tradition proffer several explanations behind
the hostility surrounding a playoff structure. First, they argue that compared
to a playoff system, bowl games maximize the number of postseason
opportunities for universities, student-athletes, and fans.58 Under a playoff
system, the number of student-athletes participating in postseason play would
be reduced from more than 5600 student-athletes participating in twenty-eight
bowl games to only 1600 student-athletes participating in a sixteen-team
playoff system. 9 Second, opponents of a playoff system contend that college
football playoffs might interfere with the academic missions of the
universities.6" To avoid conducting playoff games in the second semester,
games would be squeezed into December, which would interfere with final
examinations. 6' Third, some argue that a multigame Division I-A playoff
might substantially harm the communities hosting bowl games. 62  Bowl
organizations are nonprofit entities that not only sponsor football games, but
56. Id.
57. BCS or Bust: Competitive and Economic Effects of the Bowl Championship Series On
and Off the Field: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 43 (2003)
(statement of Myles Brand, President, NCAA).
58. BCS or Bust: Competitive and Economic Effects of the Bowl Championship Series On
and Off the Field: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 67-68 (2003)
(statement of Harvey S. Perlman, Chancellor, University of Nebraska-Lincoln) [hereinafter
Perlman Senate Statement].
59. Id. at 68. Currently, twenty-eight bowl games provide fifty-six universities the
opportunity to participate in the postseason, whereas a playoff would likely reduce the number
of universities taking part in the postseason to sixteen or fewer in a typical bracket structure.
60. Id. at 66-67. This argument is not necessarily true because the number of regular season
games could be shortened to fit a playoff structure within the same time frame as the current
bowl structure. See Mark Zeigler, The Bowl Championship Solution (Dec. 21, 2003), at http:/l
www.signonsandiego.com/sports/college._football/20031221-9999_Is2lbcs.html (proposing
a playoff solution to the BCS, in which the regular season would have a maximum of eleven
games per school, including any conference championship games).
6 1. Perlman Senate Statement, supra note 58, at 66. The student-athlete welfare argument
is undercut, however, because universities already play bowl games in December. See Rick
Alonzo, FW Bowl Showdown Will Be Hard to Match; Game Features Teams with One Loss,
Just Like BCS Championship, DAuAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 23, 2003, at I C (noting that TCU
refused to commit to the GMAC bowl because the date of the game conflicted with final exams
in 2003).
62. Perlman Senate Statement, supra note 58, at 67.
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also sponsor major events to showcase their respective local communities.63
In addition, bowl games generate enormous economic benefits for their host
cities.' Fourth, opponents of a playoff system contend that because college
football determines the national champion based on play during the regular
season, a playoff would diminish the importance of the regular season.65
Finally, some argue that bowl games provide a unique experience for the
student-athletes by allowing the athletes to enjoy the host city's attractions and
participate in philanthropic events.'
Because of the strong opposition toward instituting a playoff structure, the
unique history that bowl games have in Division I-A college football, and the
failure of Division I-A to give the NCAA authority to conduct the national
championship game, alliance advocates argue that some type of system must
be in place to ensure an undisputed national champion. The BCS was
intended to be that system.
C. Forming a "Members Only" Alliance
In 1998, the BCS was born. Its official purpose was to give college football
fans a national championship game.67 The BCS as a concept, however, is not
a new entity. Rather, the predecessor to the BCS began in the early 1990s as
63. Id.; Tribble Senate Statement, supra note 22, at 95-97 (noting that bowl committees
sponsor youth athletic endeavors, educational initiatives, scholarships, and a host of other
charitable activities).
64. Tribble Senate Statement, supra note 22, at 95 (noting that the twenty-eight bowl games
have roughly a $1.1 billion dollar impact on host communities). By incorporating the bowl
games into a playoff structure, however, this argument would fail because the bowl game
communities would continue to play a vital role in the postseason.
65. Perlman Senate Statement, supra note 58, at 69. This argument relies on the assumption
that fans would not pay as close attention to the regular season because the regular season would
not matter with a playoff system. A playoff system that factors in a team's performance in the
regular season for determining brackets, however, might alleviate this concern.
66. Id. at 67-68; Tribble Senate Statement, supra note 22, at 93-94. The legitimacy of this
argument hinges on the assumption that the student-athletes will spend a greater amount of time
in bowl cities than in playoff cities and that the student-athletes will participate in philanthropic
events. See Sports FYI: Falcons Hire Mora, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 10, 2004, at B4 (noting that
Kansas State University Coach Bill Snyder stripped quarterback Ell Roberson of his scholarship
for the spring semester as well as his ring for participation in the Fiesta Bowl after Roberson
was accused of sexually assaulting a woman the night before the bowl game and breaking team
curfew rules).
67. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 11; BOWLCHAMPIONSHIPSERIES: ABOUTTHE
BCS, at http://www.bcsfootball.orglindex.cfm?page=about (last visited Aug. 30, 2004)




an effort to change the bowl game structure to pair the top two teams in a
national championship game.68
The Cotton, Fiesta, Orange, and Sugar Bowls, along with their affiliated
conferences, formed the Bowl Coalition in 1991 69 While the Bowl Coalition
attempted to match the top two teams in a national championship game, the
agreement contained several flaws. First, the Orange, Sugar, and Cotton
Bowls continued to host their respective affiliated conference champions,
which ultimately prevented the Bowl Coalition from guaranteeing a national
championship game.7° For example, if the polls ranked former Big Eight
Conference and Southeastern Conference (SEC) champions first and second,
the affiliation agreements prevented the top two teams from playing each other
because the SEC champion would go to the Sugar Bowl and the Big Eight
champion would play in the Orange Bowl. Second, and more importantly, the
Bowl Coalition consisted of only four conferences and Notre Dame,7 thereby
precluding the possibility of a true national championship game that would be
open to all Division I-A schools.
The Bowl Alliance formed in 1995 as an attempt to cure the deficiencies
of the Bowl Coalition.72 This agreement between the Fiesta, Orange, and
Sugar Bowls, along with several conferences,73 allowed the pairing of
conference champions, which was previously barred under the Bowl
Coalition. The Bowl Alliance resulted in a true national championship game
in 1995, when Nebraska and Florida, ranked first and second respectively,
played for the national title in the Fiesta Bowl.74 The remaining years of the
Bowl Alliance, however, revealed its glaring imperfections.
In 1996, the Alliance snubbed BYU for an Alliance Bowl bid,75 despite the
school's number five national ranking and regular season record of 13-1,
which was superior to that of nearly every team that received an Alliance
bid.76 Instead of receiving the recognition and payout of an Alliance Bowl,
68. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 13.
69. Lafcadio Darling, Note, The College BowlAlliance and the Sherman Act, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 433, 437-38 (1999).
70. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 13.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (explaining that the ACC, Big East, Big 12, and SEC composed the Bowl Alliance).
74. Id. Under previous conference arrangements, this game would not have occurred
because Nebraska and Florida would have played in the Orange Bowl and the Sugar Bowl under
the Big 12 and SEC conference affiliation agreements. See id.
75. McConnell Senate Statement, supra note 36, at 10.
76. Id. (pointing out that BYU's record was superior to four of the six teams who
participated in the Alliance Bowls).
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BYU settled for the Cotton Bowl.77 Wyoming faced a similar fate.7"
Wyoming, with a higher winning percentage than three-fourths of the teams
in postseason play, did not receive an invitation to any bowl, despite
outranking the University of Texas,79 which received an automatic bid to the
Fiesta Bowl, an Alliance Bowl. ° Not only were these teams denied the high
visibility and high payout of an Alliance Bowl, but also the Bowl Alliance
agreement denied the consumers of college football, namely the fans, the
opportunity to see top performing Division I-A teams play in the top bowl
games.
8 1
Another glaring weakness of the Bowl Alliance was its incompleteness.
While the Bowl Alliance excluded certain conferences and universities, others
refused to join. 2 For example, the Big Ten and Pac-10 conferences continued
to send their conference champions to the Rose Bowl. 3 This alignment
prevented the Alliance from guaranteeing a national championship game if
either of the top two ranked teams came from the Big Ten or Pac-10
conference."4 In an attempt to correct this problem, the Alliance expanded to
include the Big Ten and Pac-10 conferences along with the Rose Bowl.8 Yet,
the advent of the so-called "Super Alliance," like the previous Bowl Coalition
77. Antitrust Implications of the College Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 17 (1997)
(statement of Sen. Craig Thomas).
78. See id. at 15 (noting that Wyoming was not invited to play in a postseason bowl game).
79. Antitrust Implications of the College Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 30 (1997)
(statement of Richard Peace, football player, University of Wyoming). Wyoming was ranked
number twenty-two in the nation by both the Associated Press and Coaches Polls. Id. Despite
ranking behind Wyoming as number twenty-three in only the Coaches Poll, Texas received an
automatic bid to an Alliance Bowl because of conference tie-ins. Id.
80. TwoCOUSiNSCOLLEGEFOOTBALEMPORIUM, athttp:/I2cuz.com/champs/1996bcs.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
81. Antitrust Implications of the College Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14 (1997)
(statement of Sen. Robert F. Bennett) (noting that the "Alliance system deprives fans of the
playoff excitement and enthusiasm that is present in other NCAA sports, and in other NCAA
football divisions").
82. See Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that the ACC, Big East, Big
12, and SEC formed the Bowl Alliance, while the Big Ten and Pac-10 refused to join). The
Bowl Alliance excluded the conferences currently classified as non-BCS conferences. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (explaining that the Bowl Alliance could not host the national championship team
on four occasions between 1991 and 1997 for this reason).
85. Mark Hales, The Antitrust Issues of NCAA College Football Within the Bowl




and Bowl Alliance, failed to create a true national championship game
because it excluded other Division I-A teams from the agreement and, thus,
from an opportunity to compete in the self-proclaimed national championship
game.
The dissolution of the Bowl Alliance in 1997 provided the necessary
impetus for creating the BCS. Unfortunately, somewhere in the transition the
momentum to create a true national championship game petered out.
86
Accordingly, the BCS fails to address many of the flaws of the Bowl Alliance,
and its set-up virtually mirrors previous alliance structures, leading some to
call it "the heir of similar associations. 87 As a result of these shortcomings,
the failure to crown an undisputed national champion still plagues college
football.88
D. BCS: The Latest Attempt to Name a "National Champion"
The BCS currently consists of four bowl games: the Fiesta, Orange, Rose,
and Sugar Bowls.8 9 These bowls rotate annually as the host venue of the BCS
national championship game.9" The respective member universities of six
conferences and Notre Dame comprise the BCS.9' The six conferences
include the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-
10, and SEC.92 Other bowl games not affiliated with the BCS host those
teams that do not receive a coveted BCS bowl bid.93
86. See Jack Carey, Coaches Recommend Tweaks to BCS Format, USA TODAY (Jan. 7,
2004), available athttp://www.usatoday.con/sports/college/football/2004-01-07-bcs-coaches-
x.htm (noting that both the University of Southern California and Louisiana State University
were selected as national champions by the Associated Press Poll and Coaches Poll respectively
after the 2003-2004 season).
87. Hales, supra note 85, at 103.
88. See id.
89. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 14; see supra note 2 (noting that the BCS will
add a fifth bowl game after the 2006 regular season).
90. BCS BOWL ELIGIBILITY, supra note 3.
91. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 14; ABOUT THE BCS, supra note 67.
92. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 14.
93. See id. at 15 (noting that the BCS leaves the traditional bowl system in place because
it does not eliminate other bowl games). Twenty-four bowl games are not affiliated with the
BCS, including, among others, the Holiday, Independence, Sun, Liberty, Peach, Outback, and
Cotton Bowls. 2003-2004 COLLEGE BOWL RESULTS, supra note 21.
For example, the Cotton Bowl, a former member of the Bowl Coalition, invites teams from
the Big 12 and SEC once the BCS selection process is complete. SBC COTrON BOWL
CLAssic - LINEUP, at http://www.swbellcottonbowl.comtsjlineup. asp (last visited Aug. 30,
2004) (noting that the Big 12 and SEC have a four-year agreement with the SBC Cotton Bowl,
expiring in 2006, which requires the Big 12 to send their first team after the BCS selection and
the SEC to send "a division champion, a division runner-up, a team with a comparable record,
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The final BCS standings determine which two teams qualify for the
national championship game as well as the other BCS bowl games. As a
result of the 2003 regular season, 94 the BCS changed its ranking system to use
three components, eliminating two of the previous components. 9 Beginning
with the 2004 season, the BCS standings will be determined by three factors:
(1) the USA Today/ESPN Coaches Poll, (2) the Associated Press Media Poll,
and (3) a computer poll average. 96 Each component will count as one-third of
a team's overall BCS score, which determines the final BCS standings. 97 The
or a mutually-agreed upon team as the Big 12's opponent in the SBC Cotton Bowl").
94. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (noting that the Associated Press and
Coaches Polls selected two different national champions after the 2003 regular season).
95. See Davis, supra note 31 (illustrating how the BCS will formulate its weekly standings,
which will be used to determine who plays in the national championship game); Bill Finley,
This Time, B.C.S. Tries an EasierApproach, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,2004, at DI (commenting that
the Associated Press Poll, Coaches Poll, and a combination of computer rankings will "each
count for one-third of a team's total ranking"); BOWLCHAMPIONSHIP SERIES: BCS STANDINGS,
at http://www.bcsfootball.org/index.cfn?page=standings (last visited Aug. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter BCS STANDINGS] (noting that "[tjhis year, the BCS standings will include three
components: the rankings of the Associated Press media poll, the USA Today/ESPN coaches
poll and a computer poll average").
Until the 2004 season, the BCS used five variables: (1) the subjective polls of the writers
and coaches; (2) various computer rankings; (3) strength of schedule; (4) team record; and (5)
quality wins versus the top ten ranked teams in the BCS standings. See Finley, supra. Voters
in the Associated Press and USA Today/ESPN Polls, however, can still take the eliminated
factors (schedule strength, team record, and quality wins) into account. Barry Jackson, Not a
Magic Formula, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 4, 2004, at 6D.
96. BCS STANDINGS, supra note 95 (discussing each of the three components). The new
formula does not average the weekly rank of each team by the Associated Press and USA
Today/ESPN Coaches Polls; rather, teams are evaluated on the number of voting points they
receive in each poll divided by the total possible voting points for that particular poll. Id. The
BCS formula will also use six computer rankings: Jeff Sagarin, who is published in USA Today;
Anderson & Hester; Richard Billingsley; Colley Matrix; Kenneth Massey; and Dr. Peter Wolfe.
Id. The computer rankings can range from 1-25; however, because a team's highest and lowest
computer rankings are dropped when figuring a team's computer poll average, the maximum
points for a team's computer poll average is 100 (4 computer polls x 25 maximum points). Id.
Finally, the three components will be "added together and averaged for a team's ranking in the
BCS standings." Id.; see also Finley, supra note 95 (noting that the computer ranking will no
longer include the New York Times computer ranking).
97. As an example of the BCS ranking formula, suppose Oklahoma earns 1590 points out
of a possible 1625 points in the Associated Press Poll for an average of .978 (1590/1625). In
the Coaches Poll, Oklahoma earns 1465 out of 1525 points for a score of.961 (1465/1525). Out
of 100 possible computer points, Oklahoma earns 94 for a score of .940. To calculate
Oklahoma's BCS average, take the sum of .978, .961, and .940, and divide by three, which





two teams with the highest numerical average - those ranked first and second
in the BCS standings98 - will play in the national championship bowl game
hosted by one of the four BCS bowls.99
The BCS contract"° reserves six of the eight slots in the BCS bowl games
annually for the champions of the six enumerated BCS conferences.''
Accordingly, the BCS arrangement translates to guaranteed berths in high-
payout bowl games 02 for the BCS conference champions. The other two
slots, termed at-large positions, are open to any Division I-A school, including
non-BCS schools, that has won at least nine regular season games and is
ranked in the top twelve of the BCS final standings.'03
The BCS arrangement clearly gives preferential treatment to BCS-affiliated
universities, while offering only a small window of opportunity for a non-BCS
school to break through to an elite bowl game. "0 Non-BCS universities can
qualify for a BCS bowl game in two ways. First, a non-BCS school will
automatically qualify for the BCS national championship game if it is ranked
first or second in the final BCS standings.0 5 Second, a non-BCS school will
qualify for one of the two at-large positions in a BCS bowl game if that non-
BCS team is ranked third through sixth in the final BCS standings."°
Consequently, for a non-BCS school to qualify for a BCS bowl game, they
must rank at the top of the Associated Press and Coaches Polls, as well as the
computer rankings.
98. BCS STANDINGS, supra note 95.
99. Id. (noting that the team with the highest average ranking will rank first in the BCS
standings).
100. The BCS contract began with the 1998-1999 bowl season and goes through the 2005-
2006 season. See ABOUT THE BCS, supra note 67.
101. BCS BOWL ELIGIBILITY, supra note 3 ("The conference champions of the Atlantic
Coast, Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Pacific-10 and Southeastern Conferences ... are guaranteed
berths."). For example, the FedEx Orange Bowl hosts the national championship game in 2005.
Id. The other three BCS bowls will use regional considerations for team selection, assuming
the conference champion is not ranked first or second in the final BCS standings. Id. The Rose
Bowl hosts the Big Ten and Pac-10 champions, the Fiesta Bowl hosts the Big 12 champion, and
the Sugar Bowl hosts the SEC champion. Id.
102. See infra Parts I.E-F.
103. BCS BOWL ELIGIBILITY, supra note 3.
104. Cowen House Statement, supra note 4, at 19; see infra Part Il.E.
105. BCS BOWL ELIGIBILITY, supra note 3.
106. Id.; Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 14. Moreover, if one or more non-BCS
teams other than Notre Dame qualify for the at-large selection pool, then Notre Dame will also
qualify for an at-large position provided it is ranked in the top ten in the final BCS standings
or has won at least nine regular season games. Id.
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E. BC Mess:10 7 Critics Claim the BCS is Unfair
Critics argue that while the BCS arrangement appears to be equally
accessible and fair to all Division I-A universities, in operation, the system
yields unfair results. In the five-year existence of the BCS, no school from
outside of the six BCS conferences, even those finishing the season
undefeated, has ever finished in the top six of the BCS standings or played in
a BCS bowl.' °8
Tulane University provides a prime example of what critics claim is the
reality of the BCS system. Despite Tulane being one of only two undefeated
teams in the country, 9 the BCS denied the school a BCS bowl bid because
Tulane did not attain the requisite ranking in the final BCS standings. Tulane
failed to clinch a top six spot primarily because of its relatively weak schedule
strength and lack of quality wins, which composed an important part of the
BCS rankings before the recent changes. Critics of the BCS also point to
other schools, such as BYU and Marshall in 2001, and Miami of Ohio, Boise
State, and Texas Christian University (TCU) in 2003, that have also been
denied BCS bowl bids despite outstanding regular seasons."'
Regardless of the inequities that result under the BCS system, BCS
advocates find justification for the BCS arrangement in the pre-BCS history
of conference relationships with certain bowl games. In the twenty years
preceding the formation of the BCS, 159 of the 160 participants in the Fiesta,
Orange, Rose, and Sugar Bowls were from BCS conferences, with the
University of Louisville being the lone exception."' Louisville's recentjump
107. Zeigler, supra note 60.
108. Cowen House Statement, supra note 4, at 22.
109. Id. at 18. The other undefeated team was the University of Tennessee, which won the
national championship game in 1998-1999. Id.
110. See id. BYU finished the regular season 12-1 in 2001 with a better win-loss percentage
than eight of the top ten BCS ranked teams. Id. Marshall University went 11-2 in 2001 and
2002, which in both seasons was a better record than eight of the ten schools ranked in the top
ten of the BCS standings. Id. Both BYU and Marshall were unable to compete in a major bowl
game because these schools are not members of the BCS and were not ranked in the top six of
the final BCS standings. Id.
Before the recent changes to the BCS formula, certain BCS ranking components, such as
strength of schedule and quality wins, hurt schools outside the six BCS conferences. For
example, non-BCS teams belonging to weaker conferences could not rely on conference
schedules to increase their strength of schedule standings. Despite the removal of these
components from the BCS standings, there is nothing to prevent the pollsters from taking
strength of schedule or quality wins into account. See Jackson, supra note 95.





from Conference USA to the Big East bolsters the BCS's argument, with the
previous bowl game participants now totaling one hundred percent. Because
the six conference champions who have guaranteed access to BCS bowl
games all had similar bowl assurances under preexisting conference
relationships, the BCS alters little in the postseason arrangement from what
has historically occurred." 1
2
In the 2003 hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, Big Ten
Commissioner Jim Delany argued that "without the guaranteed slots, [the BCS
conferences] would not have participated in the BCS arrangement" and
instead would have continued their preexisting relationships with the
individual BCS bowls." 3 BCS schools further argue that non-BCS schools
actually have more access to BCS bowl games because there are established
rules for participation in these bowls that provide non-BCS schools the
opportunity to compete in a BCS bowl game, something denied to those
schools under the previous system." 4 In practice, however, these more
inclusive rules have yet to benefit a single non-BCS school.
F. The Spoils of War: Monetary Implications of the BCS
Critics contend that by preordaining that six of the eight available slots
automatically belong to BCS schools, BCS members enjoy an unfair
competitive advantage over non-BCS schools." 5 By receiving automatic
berths to highly visible, high-payout games, BCS conferences receive
enormous revenue from the exclusion of non-BCS conferences because fewer
conferences divide the BCS's financial pie."6 Perhaps the financial aspect of
the BCS best illustrates why non-BCS schools claim that the BCS is unfair.
The BCS derives revenue from its contracts with ABC Sports and the BCS
bowl games.' "' Since the inception of the BCS, the sixty-three BCS schools
have earned more than $450 million from bowl appearances, which equates
112. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 14.
113. Id.
114. See Dennis Dodd, Notes: BCS vs. Non-BCS (Again) (Aug. 21, 2003), at http://www.
sportsline.com/collegefootball/story/6578278 (arguing that before the BCS, the "have-nots"
actually had less access to the major bowls, and that the BCS system provides stated rules for
access to the BCS games for non-BCS schools and conferences).
115. See generally Cowen House Statement, supra note 4, at 19 (arguing that the BCS's
inherent unfairness denies or limits the opportunities for other universities to earn the same
rewards).
116. Cowen House Testimony, supra note 10, at 16.
117. BOWLCHAMPIONSHIP SERIES: REVENUEDISTRIBUTION, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/
index.cfm?page=revenue (last visited Sept. 6, 2004) [hereinafter REVENUE DISTRIBUTION].
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to roughly $7 million per school."' In contrast, although a non-BCS school
has never played in a BCS bowl, the fifty-four Division I-A, non-BCS schools
have shared $17 million, or about $315,000 per school, from BCS
distributions." '9
Nevertheless, BCS advocates argue that the financial aspects of the current
system rewards those schools who make the greatest commitment and
contribution to college football. 2 ' However, critics contend that this
argument is misleading and ultimately fails for three reasons. First, when
given an opportunity to play, non-BCS teams have proven they can compete
against the top-ranked teams from BCS conferences. At the start of the 2003
season, for example, non-BCS teams upset two ACC members when Georgia
Tech lost to BYU,' 2' and Northern Illinois beat then fourteenth-ranked
Maryland. 22 Several weeks later, three teams from the non-BCS affiliated
Mid-American Conference, Marshall, Toledo, and Northern Illinois, beat top
BCS teams, Kansas State, Pittsburgh, and the University of Alabama,
respectively. 23 These victories illustrate that BCS teams do not have a
monopoly on great games and that, on any given Saturday, a non-BCS school
can hold its own against a major BCS team.
Moreover, critics contend that college football does not comprise a
homogeneous product - that is, one college football team is not necessarily
interchangeable with another. 124 In essence, each football game featuring
118. Cowen Senate Statement, supra note 6, at 16.
119. Id. (noting that $17 million has been paid to fifty-four non-BCS universities over the
life of the BCS thus far); REVENUE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 117 (noting that the BCS
contributes over $6 million per year to non-BCS Division I-A universities and also to Division
I-AA conferences for the support of the "overall health of college football"). But see Perlman
Senate Statement, supra note 58, at 70 (noting that "[w]hile the BCS generates significant
revenues .... after the expenses of the participating teams are covered and money is distributed
[to] ... the participating conferences, the total distribution per institution is relatively small.
Last year, . . . institutions in the Big 12 each received about $1.2 million from the BCS
arrangement.... By contrast, [they] generate $2.5 million to $3 million for every home football
game [they] play.").
120. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 15.
121. ESPN.COM COLLEGE FOOTBALL SCOREBOARD, at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/
scoreboard?season=2&week=2&conflD=l 7 (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
122. Id. at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/scoreboard?season=2&week=28year=2003.
123. Id. athttp://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/soreboard?season=2&week=5&conflED=4 (showing
that on September 20, 2003, Marshall defeated then sixth-ranked Kansas State); id. at http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/scoreboard?season=2&week=5& confld= 10 (showing that Toledo beat
then eleventh-ranked Pittsburgh); id. at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/scoreboard?season=2&
week=5&confld=8 (showing that Northern Illinois upset the University of Alabama).
124. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1299 (W.D. Okla. 1982)




certain Division I-A teams represents a different product, depending on the
consumer. 125 While some consumers are attracted to a live or televised game
between two powerhouse teams, most consumers are primarily interested in
a particular game because they are "personally affiliated with one of the
schools or because a team is affiliated with a local or regional college."' 126 For
example, Navy alumni and fans would much rather watch a live or televised
game between Navy and Army than one between Florida and Florida State.
Thus, the argument that BCS schools make the greatest contribution to college
football could easily be refuted by non-BCS schools' fans because one college
football game between certain universities is not necessarily substitutable with
another. '27
Finally, the argument that the BCS rewards those schools who make the
greatest contribution to college football fails because some BCS conferences
include teams that have not always been considered football powerhouses.
Moreover, some football programs inclusion among the nation's elite has been
subsequent to joining a BCS conference.'28 For example, when Virginia Tech
joined the Big East in 1991, its previous football record of 17-26-1 prevented
it from playing in the ACC. 129 Ironically, Virginia Tech is now among the
nation's elite college football programs and recently left the Big East to join
the ACC. 30
Despite BCS schools' profferedjustifications for the revenue distributions,
the revenue disparity has a substantial effect on non-BCS schools and their
conferences. The de facto exclusion of non-BCS schools prevents these
schools from obtaining the most lucrative bowl bids, which in turn hinders the
schools' overall mission by lowering athletic budgets and increasing athletic
and tradition, the color and pageantry of the event, and the interest of college alumni in the
football success of their alma mater," and noting that "there is no other product readily
substitutable for college football"); D. Kent Meyers & Ira Horowitz, Private Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws Works Occasionally: Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v.
NCAA, a Case in Point, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 669, 676 (1996).
125. Antitrust Implications of the College BowlAlliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 92 (1997)
(statement of Gary R. Roberts, Professor of Law and Sports Law Program Director, Tulane Law
School) [hereinafter Roberts Senate Statement].
126. Id.
127. Id. (recognizing that college football differs from typical service or manufacturing
industries in that one college football team is not necessarily interchangeable with another).
128. See Alan Dell, USF Takes Bold Step in Affiliating with the Big East, SARASOTA
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deficits. 13' Lower athletic budgets ultimately leads to difficulties in recruiting
both student-athletes and coaches. 2 Moreover, inferior recruiting results in
a less viable product; namely, a team that cannot compete against the
traditional powerhouses of college football, which, in turn, impacts a school's
fan base and ticket sales. For non-BCS schools, the fan base impact correlates
to non-BCS fans knowing that their schools cannot "compete for a national
championship no matter how well [they] do."' 33 Accordingly, profits from the
BCS arrangement give BCS universities a competitive advantage in building
facilities, hiring coaches, and recruiting athletes.'34
Because of the numerous adverse effects of the BCS on Division I-A
college football, a successful lawsuit appears to be an ideal solution for non-
BCS schools. After all, an antitrust lawsuit seeking both treble damages and
a permanent injunction seems relatively simple when compared to the endless
road of negotiations and concessions required to dismantle the BCS, which,
in the end, may leave non-BCS schools no better off than when the battle
began. A closer examination of the Sherman Act, however, reveals that those
who believe a lawsuit will be effective in defeating the BCS have confused
athletic competition with economic competition. In the end, a lawsuit will
prove fruitless and will not provide non-BCS universities with the "spoils"
they desire.
131. Cowen House Statement, supra note 4, at 20, 45. In analyzing the impact of athletic
deficits, another consideration is the costs that some universities face to play in certain athletic
conferences. For example, the costs to play in the Western Athletic Conference include high
travel expenses and nonlucrative television packages because the Western Athletic Conference
membership is geographically diverse and is not a part of the BCS. See John Klein, Tulane
Decision Sends a Message to the 'Have-Nots,' TULSA WORLD, June 15, 2003, at B 1.
132. Cowen House Testimony, supra note 10, at 16-17.
133. John Henderson, Taking on BCS Powers: Sept. 4 Hearing About Fairness, DENVER
POST, Aug. 20, 2003, at D 1.
134. Young House Testimony, supra note 11, at 28. This revenue disparity has even raised
congressional concern. Liz Clarke, Congress Will Get Involved in BCS Debate This Week,
WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/articles/
A8402-2003Aug3 l.html. See generally BCS or Bust: Competitive and Economic Effects of the
Bowl Championship Series On and Off the Field: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003); Competition and Antitrust Issues in College Athletic
Conferences: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003).
Specifically, non-BCS institutions claim that the BCS has a detrimental effect on their entire
athletic program, which then causes non-BCS schools to have trouble complying with Title IX.
Young House Testimony, supra note 11, at 28. Although the Title IX implications of the BCS
are beyond the scope of this comment, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs and activities. 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(2000). Under Title IX, an institution that receives federal funds and sponsors athletic programs




III. Federal Antitrust Law - The Sherman Act of 1890
The purpose of the Sherman Act'35 is to prevent or suppress practices that
create monopolies or restrain trade.'3 6 The drafters designed the Act as a
"comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade."' 37 The Sherman Act aims to
break up conduct that unfairly tends to destroy competition. '
38 Although some
dispute exists about whether the Act's purpose of imposing federal control
was for the consumer or for smaller competitors, ' courts tend to label the Act
as a "consumer welfare prescription." "4
A. How College Football and the BCS Fit the Sherman Act's Scope
The Sherman Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial
objectives. '' College football easily fits within the scope of the Sherman Act
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). Although various antitrust laws exist, "[c]ases involving
cartels, monopolization, and attempts to monopolize are still decided under the Sherman Act."
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLIcy: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 2.1 (2d ed. 1999).
136. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 463 (1920) (Day, J., dissenting).
137. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies
and Restraints of Trade § 7 (1996).
138. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 1. The Sherman Act provides
for both criminal prosecutions and civil litigation as enforcement mechanisms; however, private
parties may only enforce the Sherman Act through civil litigation. Meyers & Horowitz, supra
note 124, at 671.
The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, companion legislation to the Sherman Act, provides
that: "[Any person who shall be injured... by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue" for relief. Id. § 15(a). Pursuant to the Clayton Act, private parties may recover
treble damages, injunctive relief, and one-way attorneys' fees for antitrust violations. See id.
§§ 15(a), 26; Meyers & Horowitz, supra note 124, at 672 ("Attorney's fees are awardable only
to a successful plaintiff, not to the prevailing party.").
Notably, private plaintiffs could not seek injunctive relief until in 1964, pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 26, Congress provided that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be
entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . I..." Id  "According to some legal scholars,
private plaintiffs are using antitrust injunctions" at an ever-increasing rate. Meyers & Horowitz,
supra note 124, at 674. The remedial nature of an antitrust injunction provides for dissolving
the combination and eliminating possible future violations. John J. Flynn, A Survey of
Injunctive Relief Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 344, 349
(determining that antitrust injunctive relief "eliminate[s] the vestiges of transgressions of the
past and... prohibit[s] future violations").
139. Meyers & Horowitz, supra note 124, at 671.
140. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
141. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
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because modem collegiate football has many aspects that commercialize the
nonprofit, amateur motives of the game.'42 The commercial objectives of
college football include television contracts, corporate sponsorships, and bowl
game revenues. 43 Notably, bowl game revenue alone can yield some
universities more than $1.2 million each year.'"
In addition to college football falling within the scope of the Sherman Act,
the BCS cannot gain antitrust exemption status for two reasons: (1) the
economic interests of the BCS, and (2) its operation as a joint venture to
provide college football consumers with a national championship game.'45
Not surprisingly, the BCS and its bowl games 146 significantly add to the
commercial nature of college football. In its five-year existence, the BCS has
distributed about half a billion dollars to its member institutions.'47
Moreover, the BCS conferences operate as a joint venture to produce an
entertainment product; namely, a national championship game, through the
142. Kristin R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA 's Version of
Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 262 (2003) (noting that the commercial aspects
of college athletics prevent it from avoiding antitrust analysis).
143. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging the
business aspect of amateur athletics and noting that "intercollegiate athletics in its management
is clearly business, and big business at that").
144. Perlman Senate Statement, supra note 58, at 70 (noting the $1.2 million dollar payout
to each of the Big 12 institutions); see supra Part II-F.
145. See Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149 (finding that the NCAA's interest in providing athletic
events to the public brought the NCAA under the scope of the Sherman Act); Wallace, supra
note 33, at 70.
146. The individual bowl games, though officially nonprofit, also fall under the Sherman
Act. Tribble Senate Statement, supra note 22, at 17 (noting that the Orange Bowl Committee
is a nonprofit organization that produces the annual FedEx Orange Bowl game). The nonprofit
classification of the bowl games does not matter in an antitrust analysis. For example, in Board
of Regents, the Supreme Court subjected the NCAA to antitrust liability despite its nonprofit
status. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 n.22 (1984) (Bd. of
Regents i11); see also Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576
(1982) (illustrating that the Court will impose antitrust liability on nonprofit groups engaged in
anticompetitive conduct).
Moreover, the commercial objectives of the bowl games are evidenced by the revenues
generated. In the 2003 bowl season, for example, twenty-eight bowl games, not all of them BCS
bowls, brought economic benefits of more than $1 billion to each of the host communities.
Tribble Senate Statement, supra note 22, at 18. In effect, the BCS bowls are big business
ventures seeking to "enrich themselves and the cities in which they live." Antitrust Implications
of the College Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and
Competition, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 111 (1997) (statement of Tim Layden,
Senior Writer, Sports Illustrated).




production of four 4 ' postseason bowl games.'49 In the BCS, six conferences
have agreed to guarantee their respective conference champions automatic
berths in the BCS bowl games. 5' Thus, the joint venture is producing a
national championship game as its product. Without the agreement among the
conferences, a national championship game would probably not occur because
of the historically and contractually established conference relationships with
various bowls.'51 The BCS fits the joint venture definition because no single
team or conference could produce the product without the agreement and the
joint action of other universities and conferences.
Furthermore, the Court has expressly applied the Sherman Act's "sweeping
language" to nonprofit organizations, including institutions of higher
learning."'5 If there were any doubt about whether the Sherman Act applied
to college football, Board of Regents resolved this question with an emphatic
"yes." In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA's
arrangement for telecasting college football games violated § 1 of the Sherman
148. See supra note 2 (noting that the BCS will add a fifth bowl game after the 2006 regular
season).
149. The BCS constitutes an economic joint venture among the universities and conferences
involved. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 843 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a joint venture as "[a]
business undertaking by two or more persons engaged in a single defined project. The necessary
elements are: (1) an express or implied agreement; (2) a common purpose that the group intends
to carry out; (3) shared profits and losses; and (4) each member's equal voice in controlling the
project."); BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at
http://www.bcsfootball.org/index.cfm?page=faq (last visited Aug. 30, 2004) (noting that there
are four contracts in play - "(1) a contract between the Big Ten, Pac- 10, [and] the Rose Bowl;
(2) a Rose Bowl-ABC contract; (3) the BCS agreement with... conferences, Notre Dame, and
three bowl games, and (4) a contract between the BCS and ABC"). See generally FED. TRADE
COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
The Supreme Court held in Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963), that joint ventures are not excluded from the reach of the antitrust laws. Id. at 307; see
also HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, § 5.2 (noting that when joint ventures are condemned as
illegal combinations, it is because they eliminate competition between the parties or exclude
nonmember firms from access to a certain market).
For purposes of the antitrust laws, the joint venture of "four computer firms to develop a
new memory device and of a collegiate football conference to structure its playing schedule and
rules are treated in a surprisingly similar fashion." Id.
150. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
151. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 14.
152. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) (Bd. of
Regents III) ("There is no doubt that the sweeping language of § 1 applies to nonprofit
entities.").
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Act.'53 With its decision, the Court opened the floodgates to the pursuit of
antitrust claims in amateur athletics, '51 and consequently, § 1 of the Act would
allow an antitrust claim to be brought against the BCS.
B. The Sherman Act's Requirements of Interstate Commerce and Standing
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "restraint[s] of trade or commerce
among the several states."' 155 Thus, in addition to satisfying the scope of the
Sherman Act, the complaining party must also show that the trade restraint
affected interstate commerce under § 1 of the Act. The BCS clearly
implicates interstate commerce by inviting out-of-state teams to travel to states
where the bowl games are held.'56 Likewise, the college football regular
season implicates interstate commerce every game day when players travel to
distant locations to compete, and fans travel across state lines to support their
teams. Ultimately, the BCS and its member universities fall under the Act
because of the organization's commercial objectives 57 and the BCS's
interstate commerce.1
58
Although the Clayton Act'59 requires plaintiffs to also have standing to
pursue a Sherman Act claim," courts rarely reach a conclusion on standing
without first finding an antitrust violation.'6 ' When a court concludes that an
antitrust claim lacks merit, the court usually dismisses the claim without
considering the issue of standing. 6 ' As illustrated below, 63 there is no
153. Id. at 120.
154. Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman Act, 30 CAP.
U. L. REV. 125, 136 (2002) (noting that no other sport, except baseball, is "blessed with an
exemption from antitrust scrutiny"). See generally Bd. of Regents Ii, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
156. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1977).
157. REVENUE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 117 (reporting that estimated 2005 BCS revenue
distribution is over $93 million).
158. See generally Bd. of Regents I11, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
160. Id. § 26.
161. See Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996).
162. See id. For example, in McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988), the
appellate court did not address the standing issue and dismissed the complaint on the merits of
the antitrust claim. Id. at 1343 (deciding "not to resolve the issue whether the football players
are proper plaintiffs" but instead choosing to "address the antitrust claims on their merits"); see
also Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996) (not
reaching standing issue because the appellant had failed to show an antitrust violation); Sicor
Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 855 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995) (deciding not to address standing
because the appellant's antitrust claim had no merit).




standing issue with regard to non-BCS schools' complaints against the BCS
because no substantive antitrust claim exists. Accordingly, a court would
likely dismiss the antitrust action on the merits without addressing whether the
non-BCS conference or university had standing to sue.'
C. Choosing the Operative Section of the Sherman Act for an Antitrust
Challenge to the BCS
Several sections make up the Sherman Act, two of which are relevant to
this comment. Section 1 provides that "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is ... illegal."'' 65 The U.S.
Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States 6 6 determined that the
language of § 1 was not intended to bar all contracts that restrain trade, but
was instead designed only to bar those contracts that illustrated "unreasonable
restraints of trade."'167 Consequently, non-BCS schools must prove that the
BCS participated in an agreement that unreasonably restrained trade to show
a § 1 violation.
6
1
Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids monopolization and attempts or
conspiracies to monopolize the market. 169 In United States v. E.IL du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 70 the Supreme Court defined monopoly power as the power
to control prices or exclude competition.' 7 ' Market power sufficient to qualify
as monopoly power has been defined as the ability of a firm to increase profits
164. Although this comment argues that an antitrust claim against the BCS has no merit,
non-BCS conferences or individual universities would likely have standing. See 15 U.S.C. §
26; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984) (Bd. of Regents III) (the
University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia, both unincorporated associations,
brought suit against the NCAA, also an unincorporated association). Moreover, to fully address
the standing issue, the Clayton Act requires that the antitrust plaintiff show injury to its business
or property. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1341. Non-BCS schools could allege that the financial
disparity that exists between the payouts received by BCS conferences and non-BCS
conferences during postseason play amounts to injury to their "business." See Cowen House
Testimony, supra note 10, at 16-17.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
166. 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
167. Id. at 87.
168. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
169. HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, § 3.1.
170. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
171. Id. at 391.
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by reducing output.' Thus, to show a § 2 violation, non-BCS universities
must prove that the BCS possesses an extremely large market share.1
7 3
172. HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, § 3.1.
173. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 1983) (Bd.
of Regents I); see 2 EARLW. KINTNER, FEDERALANTITRUSTLAW § 12.6, at 352,356-57 (1980)
(collecting cases and noting that market share must approach 80% of the relevant market to
constitute monopolization of a market).
To determine market share, a court must first determine "whether some 'relevant market'
exists in which the legally necessary market power requirement can be inferred." HOVENKAMP,
supra note 135, §§ 3. ld, 3.2, 3.6 (defining the relevant product market as the smallest grouping
of sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently low that a firm with one
hundred percent of that grouping could profitably reduce output and increase price substantially
above marginal costs; noting that a relevant market includes both a relevant product market and
a relevant geographic market; and defining relevant geographic market as an area in which a
firm can increase price without customers substituting the product or competitor suppliers
bringing substitutes to the area); see Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp.
1276, 1297 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (Bd. of Regents 1) (recognizing that "[d]efining a relevant market
involves inquiries into a number of factors, including such characteristics of the industry as the
geographic area in which it is available, the time at which it is available, special characteristics
of the buyers and the sellers of the product, and special characteristics of the product itself').
Although the definition of the relevant market proves difficult in making a case against the
BCS, a court should look to International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, 358
U.S. 242 (1959), for guidance. See Bd. of Regents 1, 546 F. Supp. at 1296 (noting that the most
difficult factual inquiry in determining monopoly power is the definition of the relevant market).
In International Boxing, the Supreme Court held that championship events may constitute a
separate market from that of nonchampionship events in athletic competition. Int'l Boxing
Club, 358 U.S. at 249-51 (holding that the championship boxing contest is a different market
than all professional boxing events). Under the International Boxing rationale, a court might
determine that postseason bowl games comprise a distinct market from that of regular season
games. Assuming that postseason games comprise the relevant product market, the BCS's
market share represents roughly 14.3 % of postseason games, or four bowls out of twenty-eight
total bowl games. See Perlman Senate Statement, supra note 58, at 70, 82. Moreover, the
relevant market determination in Board of Regents I lends support to the assumption that the
relevant market would be postseason bowl games in making a case against the BCS, rather than
regular season games or sporting national championships generally. In Board of Regents I, the
district court rejected the NCAA's argument that the relevant market was all television
programming and instead held that "live college football television" was the relevant market.
Bd. of Regents I, 546 F. Supp. at 1300, 1322. In monopolization cases, a court will search for
a degree of market power possessed by a firm with an extremely large market share, usually
approaching 80% of the relevant market. See KINTNER, supra. Thus, the BCS's meager 14.3%
market share might lead to the conclusion that the BCS does not adequately monopolize the
postseason bowl game market. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377,394 (1956) (noting that "[w]hen a product is controlled by one interest, without substitutes
available.., there is monopoly power"). Clearly, this is not the case because the BCS does not




Section 1, however, will generally cover concerted action that may also
constitute monopolization; thus, it would be unnecessary for non-BCS schools
to seek relief under § 2.174 Further, unlike § 2, no elaborate industry analysis
is necessary under § 1 to show the anticompetitive character of the agreement
when there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output.'75
Accordingly, a naked restraint on price and output requires defendants to
produce procompetitive justifications under § 1, even in the absence of a
detailed market analysis.176 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma not only illustrates how a court balances the anticompetitive and
procompetitive characteristics of challenged arrangements, but also shows
why a court would analyze a potential § 1 violation by the BCS under a rule
of reason analysis.
IV. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma: The U.S.
Supreme Court Decision That Laid the Groundwork for Future Antitrust
Claims in College Football
Courts analyze federal antitrust claims based on one of three levels of
review: per se, quick look, or rule of reason.'77 In Board of Regents, the
Supreme Court used a rule of reason approach after noting that certain
industries, like athletics, require horizontal restraints if competition is to exist
at all. "'78 Thus, the per se' 9 and quick look 8 ° approaches are deemed
174. Darling, supra note 69, at 445; 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade §
4 (1996) ("Section 2 was intended to supplement § 1 and to make sure that by no possible guise
could the public policy embodied in § 1 be frustrated or evaded.").
175. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (Bd. of Regents
tiI).
176. Id. at 110.
177. Darling, supra note 69, at 450.
178. Bd. of Regents III, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
179. Courts reserve the per se approach for restraints of trade that are so unreasonable that
they are deemed illegal on their face, without an elaborate inquiry into their purported
justifications. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (holding that the per se analysis
is used for restraints that "have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such
limited potential for procompetitive benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se"); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (holding that "certain
agreements or practices are so 'plainly anticompetitive' and so often 'lack... any redeeming
virtue' that they are conclusively presumed illegal without further examination") (quoting Nat'l
Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) and N. Pac. Ry. Co v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)); Mark R. Leduc, Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association:
A Guide to How Courts Will Treat Future Antitrust Challenges to NCAA Regulations, 26 J.C.
& U.L. 139, 146 (1999) (noting that the court applies the per se doctrine to find certain types
of business practices illegal without a formal adjudication of their reasonableness). A court
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inapplicable 8' in the context of college football because of the Court's
typically reverts to the per se approach for cases involving price fixing, concerted refusal to
deal, tying arrangements, group boycotts, and division of markets. See Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959) (finding an agreement not to sell to
an individual retailer constituted a group boycottsubject to the per se rule); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593,597-98 (1951) (holding division of markets among
conspirators is a per se violation); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1945)
(finding thatjoint newspaper venture cannot expressly prohibit transactions with nonmembers);
Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941) (holding a group
boycott is per se illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)
(finding that major oil refiners' concerted program to purchase distressed gasoline to prop up
market price constitutes price fixing subject to per se analysis). But see Smith v. Pro Football
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (determining that a court will avoid using the per
se rule in group boycott situations where "the need for cooperation among participants
necessitated some type of concerted refusal to deal"); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l
BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 126-27 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973) (refusing to invoke the per se
rule where the product represented by the bank credit card required cooperative relationships
among member banks, and the product would be impossible for any bank to issue on its own).
180. The quick look approach is a truncated version of the rule of reason analysis. See Cal.
Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756,757 (1999) (holding that the quick look standard is reserved
for cases in which "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers
and markets"); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the
quick look approach applies in cases "where per se condemnation is inappropriate," but where
no elaborate analysis is needed to show the anticompetitive effects of the questionable restraint);
Leduc, supra note 179, at 148-49 (noting that courts employ this intermediate level of scrutiny
where "the adverse impact of a restraint... is obvious on its face, but the per se prohibition is
deemed inappropriate"). In a quick look analysis, the court relieves the plaintiff of the initial
burden of proving anticompetitive effects when the harmful effect of the challenged conduct is
evident, and the initial burden is placed on the defendant to proffer procompetitive justifications
for the restraint. Chi. Prof 1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 674
(7th Cir. 1992) (noting that if the defendant fails to set forth legitimate justifications for the
restraint, "the court condemns the practice without ado"). If the defendant succeeds in offering
valid procompetitive justifications, then the court resorts to the traditional rule of reason
analysis to weigh the reasonableness of the restraint. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669.
181. To find that the BCS constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act, a court would
have to determine that the BCS has a severe anticompetitive impact and lacks a countervailing
benefit. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir. 1998); see PHILLIP E. AREEDA,
ANTrrRUST LAW 1478, at 359 (1986) (noting that courts "have not woodenly applied the per
se prohibitions developed for ordinary business situations" to sports leagues); Leduc, supra note
179, at 146.
To use the quick look approach, a court would need to conclude that the arrangement in
question had an obvious anticompetitive effect on customers and markets. Cal. Dental Ass'n,
526 U.S. at 757. The BCS arrangement is not obviously anticompetitive. After all, there are
twenty-four other bowl games in which universities may participate, and there are mechanisms




determination that a rule of reason analysis is required in certain industries
like athletics.1
8 2
A. Board of Regents: Facts and Prior History
Board of Regents presented the U.S. Supreme Court with an opportunity to
decide the extent to which federal antitrust laws apply to intercollegiate
athletics and the standard of review that should be used for antitrust claims in
college athletics.'83 The lawsuit stemmed from the NCAA television plan that
limited the total number of televised intercollegiate football games and the
number of games that any one college could televise. 4 The plan did not
allow NCAA-member institutions, including plaintiffs the University of
Oklahoma (Oklahoma) and the University of Georgia (Georgia), to sell any
television rights except in accordance with the NCAA plan.'85
The main controversy arose when a number of NCAA-member football
conferences and independent schools, including Oklahoma and Georgia,
joined together to form the College Football Association (CFA). 86 After the
CFA negotiated an independent television contract with the National
understanding of the market shows that the BCS contract has procompetitive effects, such as
increasing overall bowl revenues and opportunities for all college football teams. See Toscano
v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002) ("In producing an
entertainment product, the [PGA] Tour incorporates an element of competition as part of the
product but the [participants] are not in economic competition with one another any more than
the celebrity participants in a game show or the runners in a track meet. The presence of
obvious procompetitive justifications for the eligibility rules, in the sense that they help to create
the product, and the corresponding absence of clear anticompetitive effect, require application
of full rule of reason analysis.").
182. See Bd. of Regents III, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
183. Before Board of Regents, courts had applied federal antitrust laws to professional
sports, including basketball, golf, and hockey. See Michael Jay Kaplan, Annotation,
Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489 (1974).
184. Bd. of Regents III, 468 U.S. at 94 (noting that the plan's requirements mandated that
the carrying television networks schedule television appearances for at least eighty-two different
universities and that no member university was eligible to appear on television more than a total
of six times - no more than four times nationally during any two-year period - with these
appearances divided equally among the two networks, ABC and CBS). Football was the only
sport in which the NCAA regulated the televising of athletic events. Schools were free to make
whatever television arrangements they desired in other sports. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.
v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (Bd. of Regents 1).
185. Bd. of Regents I1, 468 U.S. at 94. The plan allowed NCAA members a limited
opportunity to televise their games if the member obtained special permission from the NCAA
to telecast a specific game within a limited geographic area on a local station. Bd. of Regents ,
546 F. Supp. at 1284.
186. Bd. of Regents 1, 546 F. Supp. at 1285.
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Broadcasting Company (NBC), the NCAA threatened disciplinary procedures
and sanctions against participating CFA members for violating the NCAA
rules. 8 7 The NCAA made clear that the sanctions would affect not only the
football programs of the CFA members, but also other intercollegiate sports. '88
Oklahoma and Georgia filed suit in the Western District of Oklahoma,
challenging the NCAA' s right to require its television plan to be exclusive and
seeking injunctive relief' 89 The plaintiffs claimed that the NCAA restrained
their right to enter into their own television contracts, amounting to a "classic
cartel" in violation of § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act. 90 The district court
held that "NCAA controls over college football make [the] NCAA a classic
cartel" and that this finding entitled the plaintiffs to injunctive and declaratory
relief.'9' Relying on both a per se and rule of reason analysis, the court
determined that under § 1, the NCAA television plan constituted price fixing
and a group boycott, and that under § 2, the NCAA monopolized the
intercollegiate football broadcasting market.' 92 Central to the district court's
reasoning was that the NCAA imposed what amounted to production limits on
its members and maintained mechanisms for punishing members who sought
to stray from the production quotas. ' Moreover, the distribution of television
revenues under the NCAA plan did not resemble the distribution expected in
a free market. 94
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the finding that
the NCAA television plan constituted price fixing and was per se illegal under
§ 1.'9 The appellate court rejected the NCAA's argument that the purpose of
the television plan was to promote athletically balanced competition, reducing
the consideration to an argument that "competition will destroy the market."' 96
Because the court affirmed the § 1 price-fixing claim, it did not consider the
monopolization claim under § 2, noting that a reversal of the district court's
§ 2 ruling would not affect the injunction.97 The appellate court, however,
reversed the district court's finding that the NCAA plan amounted to a group
187. Id. at 1285-86.
188. Id. at 1286.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1281.
191. Id. at 1300.
192. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1983)
(Bd. of Regents 11).
193. Bd. of Regents , 546 F. Supp. at 1301.
194. Bd. of Regents II, 707 F.2d at 1154.
195. Id. at 1162.
196. Id. at 1154.




boycott, holding that the colleges were not in competition with the
broadcasters, which was a necessary element to the existence of an illegal
boycott. 98
With relatively few federal court decisions applying federal antitrust laws
to amateur athletics,'99 the U.S. Supreme Court granted the NCAA's petition
for writ of certiorari to determine (1) whether the per se approach was the
proper standard of review for college athletics under federal antitrust law, and
(2) whether the NCAA television plan violated the Sherman Act.
2 °
B. Majority Holding and Reasoning
1. The Supreme Court Rejects a Per Se Approach
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the
NCAA television plan limited output and restrained the ability of any
institution to make a sale of television rights outside of the plan.2 1' The Court,
however, favored a rule of reason approach over a per se approach in its
antitrust analysis because of the nature of college football.20 2 The Court
decided that
it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. This
decision is not based on a lack ofjudicial experience with this type
of arrangement, on the fact that the NCAA is organized as a
nonprofit entity, or on our respect for the NCAA's historic role in
the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate amateur
athletics. Rather, what is critical is that this case involves an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential
if the product is to be available at all.203
198. Bd. of Regents II, 707 F.2d at 1160; Meyers & Horowitz, supra note 124, at 683. The
NCAA also contended that the injunction granted by the district court was too vague and overly
broad. Bd. of Regents II, 707 F. 2d. at 1161-62. The Tenth Circuit remanded the issue on the
breadth of the injunction to allow the district court to consider its injunction in light of the
appellate opinion. Id. at 1162. After the district court's review, the injunction remained
virtually the same. Meyers & Horowitz, supra note 124, at 683.
199. Bd. of Regents II, 707 F.2d at 1164 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
200. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 464 U.S. 913 (1983).
201. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984) (Bd. of Regents
III).
202. Id. at 100.
203. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
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The Court determined that college football was unique in the sense that the
NCAA and its member institutions were marketing competition itself.2"4 In
other words, the Court reasoned that there would be no product if "there was
not cooperation between competing teams, their conferences, and other
necessary entities."205 Departing from a per se approach, which was generally
afforded to horizontal price-fixing arrangements, the Court instead adopted a
rule of reason approach. Despite this departure, the Court nevertheless
affirmed the district court and appellate court decisions using the rule of
reason standard.' 6
2. Rule of Reason Analysis: A Closer Look
The rule of reason analysis, now the most common standard employed by
courts in antitrust claims involving amateur athletics,2 7 balances several
factors by using a burden-shifting test. 8 Courts use this test when the effects
on full and free competition are not readily apparent.2 9 Under a rule of reason
analysis, the court must analyze the "facts peculiar to the business, the history
of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.
' 210
A rule of reason analysis involves a step-by-step approach. First, to
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove the anticompetitive
effects of the restraint of trade."' This burden requires the plaintiff to show
204. Id. at 101.
205. Meyers & Horowitz, supra note 124, at 685.
206. Id.
207. Muenzen, supra note 142, at 265 (noting that the Supreme Court uses the rule of reason
in cases involving restraints of trade in college athletics); see Bd. of Regents III, 468 U.S. at 103
(holding that the price and output restrictions at issue were subject to a rule of reason analysis);
Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996) (using a rule of reason
analysis to find that imposing sanctions for violations of NCAA rules did not violate § 1 of the
Sherman Act); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1088-94 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the no-
draft and no-agent rules for student athletes do not offend the Sherman Act under a rule of
reason analysis); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 379-82 (D. Ariz. 1983) (determining that
NCAA sanctions for violations of a rule barring student-athlete compensation did not violate
antitrust laws under rule of reason standard).
208. See Darling, supra note 69, at 458.
209. Id.
210. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); see also Bd.
of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918) (recognizing that the history
of the restraint and the purpose sought to be attained by imposing the restraint are relevant
facts). Contrast the rule of reason analysis with a per se approach where a court deems the
restraint of trade illegal on its face without an elaborate inquiry into the restraint's justifications.
See supra note 179.




that the restraint has a "substantially adverse effect on competition. 2 2
Anticompetitive effects are shown by a reduction of output, 213 increase in
price, deterioration in the quality of goods or services, 214 or proof of the
defendant's "market power. "215
If the plaintiff satisfies their burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to present evidence that the procompetitive benefits outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of the restraint.1 6 An arrangement that restrains trade
survives judicial scrutiny only if the procompetitive effects excuse the
anticompetitive result.21 7 In amateur athletic cases, courts will recognize only
those justifications "necessary to produce competitive intercollegiate sports"
as legitimate rationales.21 8 Courts have accepted increasing output, creating
operating efficiencies, making a new product available, enhancing product or
service quality, and widening consumer choice as justifications for otherwise
anticompetitive effects.219 Courts have refused, however, to recognize mere
profitability or cost savings as a legitimate justification for anticompetitive
behavior.22°
Finally, if the defendant meets the burden of presenting procompetitive
benefits, then the plaintiff must show that the procompetitive effects could be
achieved in a less restrictive manner or that the restraint fails to promote the
defendant's stated objective. 221' Essentially, this final burden requires the
plaintiff to show that the restraint was not "reasonably necessary to achieve
the stated objective. '222  The court then determines whether the
procompetitive aspects of the conduct justify the anticompetitive effects.
223
satisfies this burden by "proving the existence of actual anticompetitive effects").
212. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir. 1998).
213. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986).
214. See Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3rd Cir. 1991).
215. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) (Bd. of
Regents III). A requisite showing of the defendant's market power represents an indirect way
of establishing an anticompetitive effect. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (finding a plaintiff may
establish an anticompetitive effect indirectly by adducing evidence of the defendant's market
power or directly by showing actual anticompetitive effects, such as control over price or
output).
216. See Leduc, supra note 179, at 148.
217. Law, 134 F.3d at 1021.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1023.
221. Darling, supra note 69, at 459.
222. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993).
223. Law, 134 F.3d at 1017.
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3. Board of Regents: The Supreme Court's Application of the Rule of
Reason Analysis in College Football
Using the rule of reason analysis, the Supreme Court in Board of Regents
held that the NCAA's arrangement limited output and fixed prices, leaving the
college football industry unresponsive to consumer preference. 24 Although
the Court employed a rule of reason approach, the Court commented that the
ultimate focus of the analysis was "to form a judgment about the competitive
significance of the restraint. "225
The Court found several anticompetitive consequences of the arrangement.
The NCAA's television plan had the anticompetitive effect of causing
individual competitors to lose their freedom to compete 26 because the plan:
(1) placed a ceiling on the number of games member institutions could
televise, and (2) artificially limited the quantity of televised college football
available to broadcasters and consumers.
The Court then looked to the NCAA to establish procompetitive benefits
of the agreement to justify the plan's deviation from the operation of a free
market.228  The NCAA, however, failed to proffer any legitimate,
procompetitive justifications for its television plan.2 29 Relying on Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BM/),230 the NCAA
argued that the television plan constituted a joint venture to protect the live
attendance at intercollegiate football games and assist in the marketing of
broadcast rights.21 The Court, however, rejected the NCAA's argument on
the basis that the NCAA television plan limited, not enhanced, production
because no individual school remained free to televise its own games without
23restraint. 32 In contrast to the NCAA's plan, the BMI plan did not place limits
224. NCAA v. Rd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (Bd. of Regents
III).
225. Id. at 103 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978)).
226. Id. at 106-07.
227. Id. at 99.
228. Id. at 113.
229. See id. at 115.
230. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
231. Bd. of Regents I1, 468 U.S. at 113-15. In BMI, television networks unsuccessfully
brought an antitrust suit against the licensing agencies for musical composers, alleging that the
system by which the licensing agencies received fees for the issuance of blanket licenses
constituted illegal price fixing. Id. at 114.




on production and also freed individual artists to sell their own music without
restraint.
233
C. Courts Follow the Supreme Court's Lead from Board of Regents: A
Brief Look at the Cases in Intercollegiate Athletics Using a Rule of Reason
Analysis
Subsequent antitrust cases have used the rule of reason standard to analyze
other combinations in college athletics under the Sherman Act. In Regents of
the University of California v. American Broadcasting Co.,234 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court decision granting a
preliminary injunction against the ABC and CFA television plan.235 Relying
on Board of Regents, the court determined that the plaintiffs had established
a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their antitrust claim.23 6 The
court held that the arrangement between ABC and the CFA shared the same
infirmities as the NCAA television plan, namely a reduction in output and a
sharp restraint on competition between individual schools.237 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit decided that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
issuing a preliminary injunction against the television plan.238
In Law v. NCAA,239 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an NCAA
rule that limited a coach's annual compensation violated the Sherman Act
under a rule of reason analysis.24° The NCAA did not contest the district
court's determination that the rule had the anticompetitive effect of
unreasonably restraining trade,24 and the appellate court rejected the NCAA's
proffered procompetitive justifications of cost-reduction24 2 and the
maintenance of competitive equity among member institutions.243 Ultimately,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on
the issue of antitrust liability.2 4
Cases following Board of Regents also illustrate the difficulties inherent in
bringing antitrust claims in intercollegiate athletics. For example, in Banks v.
233. Id. at 114.
234. 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984).
235. Id. at 515.
236. Id. at 519.
237. Id. at 518.
238. Id. at 519.
239. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
240. Id. at 1012.
241. Id. at 1016.
242. Id. at 1022-23.
243. Id. at 1023-24.
244. Id. at 1012.
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NCAA,245 a college football player brought an action alleging that the NCAA's
no-draft, no-agent rules violated the Sherman Act. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff s complaint, finding that
although the plaintiff cited examples of antitrust law violations, such as group
boycott, price fixing, and restriction of output, the plaintiff failed to allege the
anticompetitive effects of the NCAA rules.2" The court noted that the
absence of anticompetitive allegations "is ordinarily fatal to the existence of
a cause of action. 247
D. Is a Rule of Reason Analysis Applicable to the BCS?
An antitrust claim against the BCS should fall under a rule of reason
analysis because college football has been recognized as an industry in which
horizontal restraints on athletic competition are necessary to allow the
product, whether a regular season or national championship game, to be
available at all.248 A horizontal restraint of trade is "an agreement among
competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another. 2 49 In
essence, college football requires its producers, namely the individual
universities and conferences, to agree to compete with one another under
certain rules of competition to make regular season games and bowl games
possible.25
Furthermore, the BCS produces a national championship game, which
serves as an entertainment product for the consumer. The court's analysis in
Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc.,25 concluding that a rule of reason analysis should
apply in a case involving professional golf, also supports the conclusion that
the BCS would be subject to a rule of reason analysis:
In producing an entertainment product, the [PGA] Tour
incorporates an element of competition as part of the product but
245. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
246. id. at 1087.
247. Id. (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (7th Cir.
1984)).
248. Gregory M. Krakau, Note, Monopoly and Other Children's Games: NCAA 's Antitrust
Suit Woes Threaten Its Existence, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 403 (2000) (referring to NCAA v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (Bd. of Regents II1), where the Court held that
rule of reason was appropriate because the case "involve[d] an industry in which horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all"); see Roberts
Senate Statement, supra note 125, at 89-90 (rule of reason).
249. Bd. of Regents II1, 468 U.S. at 99.
250. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546F. Supp. 1276, 1295 (W.D. Okla. 1982)
(Bd. of Regents 1).




the [participants] are not in economic competition with one another
any more than the celebrity participants in a game show or the
runners in a track meet. The presence of obvious procompetitive
justifications for the... rules, in the sense that they help to create
the product, and the corresponding absence of clear
anticompetitive effect, require application of full rule of reason
analysis. 52
The NCAA does not run a playoff system to determine a national
champion; thus, universities and conferences must work together to give fans
a national championship game. The BCS arrangement requires its member
conferences to agree to send their respective champions to BCS bowl games,
otherwise, the agreement would fail.253 Both the general nature of athletic
competition in college football and the BCS agreement require horizontal
restraints on competition to allow the bowl games, or athletic competition, to
exist at all.
Following Board of Regents and its progeny, the next logical step in a rule
of reason analysis of the BCS would be to balance the anticompetitive results
against the procompetitive benefits of the BCS. The next section illustrates
why this seemingly logical step would be incorrect given the policy reasons
behind the federal antitrust laws.
V. Confusing Athletic and Economic Competition: The Legality of the BCS
A. Missing the Crucial Second Step
After determining that a rule of reason analysis applies to an antitrust claim
against the BCS, several legal scholars who support the claim that the BCS
system violates the Sherman Act suggest that the next step is to address the
procompetitive and the anticompetitive aspects of the BCS. 2' Though the BCS
exemplifies both anticompetitive25 and procompetitive characteristics,
56 this
252. Id. at 1121.
253. See supra notes 25-28, 69-85 and accompanying text.
254. See Roberts Senate Statement, supra note 125, at 89-90; see generally Darling, supra
note 69; Hales, supra note 85; Wallace, supra note 33.
255. The alleged anticompetitive aspects of the BCS are presented in Parts II.E-F. These
aspects include not only financial and branding benefits for those schools associated with the
BCS, but also the stark reality that those outside of the BCS may never compete in a BCS bowl
game under the current arrangement. See supra Parts H.E-F.
256. The BCS might argue that the arrangement's procompetitive benefit of pairing the top
two teams in a national championship game justifies any competitive restraint that a non-BCS
school or conference might allege. See Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 15 (defining
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comment contends that those scholars are overlooking an essential step before
weighing the anticompetitive and procompetitive features of the BCS -
whether the challenged restraint impedes economic competition.257
Successful antitrust challenges in intercollegiate athletics, such as Board of
Regents, Regents of the University of California, and Law, share something in
common - the contested combinations in each case had the intentional effect
of limiting output along with "sharp restraints on individual school
competition." '258 In contrast, the BCS arrangement fails to limit output because
it does not restrict the number of bowl games played in the postseason. In fact,
the number of bowl games has increased, rather than decreased, since the advent
of the BCS. 25 9 Thus, it appears that economic competition has actually been
enhanced, not diminished, by the BCS.264
The possibility for a successful antitrust lawsuit would exist if the BCS bowl
games were the only bowl games, or if the BCS completely foreclosed the non-
BCS schools from an opportunity to participate in the BCS bowl games. 26' Such
an arrangement would clearly limit output and cause sharp restraints in the
ability of a university to compete. However, this is not the case under the
current BCS system. Rather, the BCS bowl games are simply four2 62 bowl
games that provide two at-large positions for any Division I-A school.263 In
addition, the BCS does not control or diminish the ability of the other twenty-
four bowl games to compete. Ultimately, the NCAA, not the BCS, has the
power to restrict the number of bowl games played because of the NCAA
certification process.
z6
the BCS as a "new product that is highly valued by the consumers of college football").
257. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (Bd. of Regents
111) (noting that the ultimate inquiry under the antitrust laws is whether the challenged restraint
enhances economic competition).
258. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 511,518 (9th Cir.
1984).
259. See 2003-2004 COLLEGE BOWL RESULTS, supra note 21.
260. Division I-A teams play twenty-four bowl games in addition to the four BCS bowl
games, providing an opportunity for fifty-six teams to participate in postseason play. See
Tribble Senate Statement, supra note 22, at 92-93.
261. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1311 (W.D. Okla.
1982) (Bd. of Regents 1) (noting that if a "power elite" in college football emerged and abused
its competitive edge through illegal means, there would be some form of relief under the
Sherman Act).
262. See supra note 2 (noting that the BCS will add a fifth bowl game after the 2006 regular
season).
263. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
264. See generally NCAA-NATIONALCOLLEGATEATHLETICASsOCIATION, at http://www.




Unlike the universities in Board ofRegents, individual competitors inside and
outside of the BCS, including bowl games and all Division I-A universities, have
not lost their freedom to compete. 265 Competition in Division I-A, even with the
BCS arrangement, remains strong for several reasons. First, the BCS allows
other bowl games to enter the market and in no way eliminates the ability of
another entity from sponsoring a new bowl game.26 Second, the BCS does not
prevent the non-BCS schools or other bowl games from forming another bowl
alliance and naming a "national champion." Moreover, the BCS does not hold
the exclusive rights to crown a national champion. This is clearly evidenced by
the 2003 season, where the Associated Press Poll named the University of
Southern California national champion, and the Coaches Poll named the winner
of the BCS title game, Louisiana State University, national champion.267
In essence, the BCS is buying football services from six historically winning
football conferences, marketing those teams and four26 BCS bowl games to
football fans, and calling the product a national championship game. Although
the BCS excludes certain Division I-A schools, not every agreement that
restrains competition violates the Sherman Act. Rather, to be unlawful, the
agreement must unreasonably restrain competition, and the BCS clearly does
not unreasonably restrain trade. While the BCS arrangement is not inclusive of
all Division I-A schools and conferences, its capitalization on the bowl game
market does not violate the antitrust laws because the Sherman Act does not
mandate forced access absent application of the essential facilities doctrine.2 69
265. NCAAv. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106-07 (1984) (Bd. of Regents
11I) (noting that under the NCAA television plan, "[i]ndividual competitors [lost] their freedom
to compete").
266. For example, the PlainsCapital Fort Worth Bowl Game started in 2003, featuring top-
ranked non-BCS schools, TCU and Boise State. PLAINSCAPITALFORT WORTH BOWL, at http://
www.fwbowl.com (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
267. Stewart Mandel, New BCS Boss Undaunted By Challenges (Jan. 8, 2004), at http:fl
sportsillustrated.cnn.com12004/writers/stewart-mandeII0l/08/weiberg.bcs/index.htm. Thus,
college football fans can be certain that the BCS does not have the final word on naming the
national champion in Division I-A.
268. See supra note 2 (noting that the BCS will add a fifth bowl game after the 2006 regular
season).
269. The essential facilities doctrine is invoked when access to an "essential facility" is
denied by one competitor to another. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881 (2004). "[Wlhere access exists, the doctrine serves no
purpose." Id. Lower courts crafted the essential facilities doctrine, but the Supreme Court has
never recognized the doctrine. Id. (noting that the "[Court] find[s] no need either to recognize
[the essential facilities doctrine] or to repudiate it here"). According to Phillip Areeda, the
essential facilities doctrine has five elements: "(1) whenever competitors jointly create a useful
facility, (2) that is essential to the competitive vitality of rivals, (3) and (perhaps) essential to
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The federal antitrust laws are in place to judge competition, not the fairness
of who was included and excluded from a particular business venture.270 Courts
have accepted the longstanding principle that the Sherman Act does not prevent
a party from unilaterally determining the parties with whom it will deal and the
terms under which the party will transact business.27" ' Thus, the antitrust laws
will not force the BCS to allow the non-BCS universities complete access to the
BCS arrangement.
272
Additionally, non-BCS schools are not completely excluded from the BCS,
so any claim that the BCS arrangement constitutes a group boycott is legally
flawed.273 A classic group boycott2 arises in a horizontal agreement where the
accused boycotters possess market power or exclusive access to a market.275 A
crucial element to a horizontal group boycott claim is that an effort exists by one
entity to exclude one or more of its competitors by "cutting them off from trade
relationships which are necessary to any firm trying to compete. 276 In Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,277 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
successful group boycott claim existed where the retailer induced wholesalers
and manufacturers to refuse to supply its competitor. The Supreme Court cases
the competitive vitality of the market, (4) and admission of rivals is consistent with the
legitimate purposes of the venture, then (5) the collaborators must admit rivals on relatively
equal terms." Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANTITRUST L. J. 841, 844 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
270. For example, suppose that Wal-Mart and Target decide to pursue a private business
venture but opt not to include K-Mart in the project. K-Mart wants to file suit to gain access
to the joint venture between Wal-Mart and Target. Absent application of the essential facilities
doctrine, Wal-Mart and Target would have no obligation to allow K-Mart to join the agreement
because the federal antitrust laws do not mandate forced access. Nothing prevents K-Mart,
however, from pursuing other options, such as a joint venture with Sears.
271. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
272. See Areeda, supra note 269, at 852 ("There is no general duty to share. Compulsory
access, if it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional.... No one should be forced to deal
unless doing so is likely substantially to improve competition in the marketplace by reducing
price or by increasing output or innovation.").
273. Contra McConnell Senate Statement, supra note 36, at 9 ('There is substantial evidence
that the most powerful conferences and the most powerful bowls have entered into agreements
to allocate the postseason bowl market among themselves and to engage in a group boycott of
non-Alliance teams and bowls.").
274. A classic group boycott refers to a horizontal group boycott. The distinction is
important because different rules apply for vertical group boycotts.
275. See Wallace, supra note 33, at 68.
276. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 1983) (Bd.
of Regents II) (quoting LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOKOFTHELAW OFANTITRUST
§ 91, at 260 (1977)).




finding successful horizontal group boycott claims 278 all reflect conduct whereby
one group induces the concerted action of others "to deprive competing firms of
necessary trade relationships. 279  No similar situation exists in the BCS
arrangement. Simply because certain Division I-A teams are unsuccessful at
making it to a BCS bowl does not turn the BCS arrangement into a group
boycott. Further, the effort by BCS universities and conferences to foster a
national championship game, as well as three other major bowl games, does not
manifest a purpose to exclude other universities, as evidenced by the two
available slots for any Division I-A school that qualifies to compete in a BCS
bowl game.20 Horizontal group boycott claims are properly restricted to
concerted attempts by one competitor to exclude horizontal competition; a
classic group boycott claim "should not be applied, and has never been applied
by the Supreme Court, to concerted refusals that are not designed to drive out
competitors but to achieve some other goal. 2' Although some might argue that
the BCS drives out other Division I-A universities, a court would likely reject
this claim because the two at-large positions and the sharing of BCS revenues
with non-BCS schools, regardless of their participation in a BCS bowl game,
illustrate that no BCS member is interested in driving another university out of
the football business.282
The BCS agreement exists not to insulate non-BCS schools from competition
but to improve the entertainment product. Moreover, the BCS and its member
institutions market competition, or more specifically, bowl games between
universities, which provide exciting contests between the top institutions. This
"product" would be completely nonexistent if there was no method for choosing
the teams or defining the product to be marketed.283 The actions of the BCS
actually widen consumer choice, not only in terms of bowl games available to
sports fans, but also the choices available to athletes, and should be viewed as
procompetitive.2 4 Without the BCS agreement, football teams would likely
278. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(determining a group boycott existed where manufacturers coerced an adverse "seal of approval"
decision with regard to the product of a competitor); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc.
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (finding a group boycott where clothing manufacturers organized
a boycott of retailers who dealt in the clothing of competing manufacturers).
279. Bd. of Regents I, 707 F.2d at 1161.
280. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
281. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
282. See Delany House Testimony, supra note 1, at 10; REVENUE DISTRIBUTION, supra note
117.
283. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (Bd. of
Regents 11f).
284. See id. at 102.
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continue to play bowl games according to their conference affiliations with
certain bowl games. Consequently, the bowl system would face the same
problem that plagued college football teams and fans before a bowl alliance -
the possibility that certain conference and bowl relationships would prevent the
crowning of a true national champion.285
Ironically, the non-BCS schools' arguments for access to the BCS in an
antitrust suit would be strikingly similar to those justifications the NCAA
proffered in Board of Regents, which were rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The NCAA's position was that the television contracts promoted athletically
balanced competition. 86 The Tenth Circuit concluded that such a consideration
amounted to an argument that "competition will destroy the market," a position
entirely inconsistent with the policy of the Sherman Act.287 Likewise, non-BCS
schools contend that an open BCS arrangement will promote fairness and
balanced competition.288
Non-BCS schools also claim that the revenue structure of the BCS, which
predominately rewards BCS members, is problematic under the federal antitrust
laws.289 Although the concerns over the BCS revenue structure are
troublesome, 9° these concerns are not novel to the courts, nor indicative of an
antitrust violation. In response to the NCAA's similar concerns in using a
member-wide television plan, District Judge Burciaga commented in Board of
Regents that
[m] any less prominent schools seek to expand their football revenues
beyond what they would receive in a non-cartelized market.... The
NCAA's attempts to placate the prominent producers, such as
Georgia and Oklahoma, have failed. These plaintiffs and others
whose superior competitive practices have earned them prominence
in the sport of college football wish to no longer suffer the economic
injury visited upon them by the less prominent members of the
cartel.29'
In Board of Regents, the NCAA strenuously argued that increased revenues for
universities like Oklahoma would give those universities an overwhelming
285. Delany House Statement, supra note 1, at 13-14.
286. Bd. of Regents I1, 468 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added).
287. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir.
1983)).
288. See Cowen House Statement, supra note 4, at 19.
289. Id.; Young House Testimony, supra note 11, at 28.
290. See supra note 134 (discussing the potential Title IX implications of the BCS).
291. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276,1301 (W.D. Okla. 1982)




advantage over other schools.292 The NCAA contended that schools that failed
to generate large revenues would never compete with the "power elite" of fifteen
or twenty schools that would emerge in a free market situation.293 The district
court rejected this argument, finding that a "power elite" already existed because
some teams are televised more often and produce far better television ratings
than others.294
Ultimately, the non-BCS claims amount to concerns for fairness in athletic
competition. Unfortunately for non-BCS universities, the Sherman Act protects
economic competition, not fairness in athletic competition. Therefore, non-BCS
schools should resort to other means besides the federal antitrust laws to redress
their fairness claims.
B. Back to Basics in Antitrust Law: The Sherman Act's Purpose and
Protections
Antitrust law in the United States is not concerned with fairness.295 Rather,
antitrust law seeks to promote free enterprise and competition in the
marketplace. 96 Although the BCS system may seem unfair, this alleged
unfairness does not equate to an antitrust violation.
In the end, claims that the BCS violates federal antitrust law simply cannot
stand when measured against the purpose of the Sherman Act.297 The purpose
292. Id. at 1310.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
(stating that antitrust law is not about fairness); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. and European Merger
Policy- Fault Lines and Bridges: Mergers That Create IncentivesforExclusionary Practices,
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 478 (2002); Jennifer E. Gladieux, Comment, Towards a Single
Standard for Antitrust: The Federal Trade Commission's Evolving Rule of Reason, 5 GEO.
MASONL. REV. 471,476 n.23 (1997) ("The main judicial dispute over antitrust's goals concerns
whether antitrust should promote fairness or economic efficiency."). But see Daria Roithmayr,
Barriers To Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727,799 (2000)
(identifying the main issue in antitrust law as economic efficiency). "[Miany conservative
antitrust scholars reject competitive fairness and the equality of calculus. The fairness argument
seems to have prevailed in earlier decisions such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962). However, more recent decisions show that maximizing consumer welfare (economic
efficiency) is the primary goal of the antitrust laws." Id.
296. See 1 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERALANTITRUST LAW § 1. 1, at 1 (1980).
297. District Judge Burciaga in Board of Regents recognized that
[t]he basic policy of the Act is that economic competition be unrestrained. The
policy rests on the premise that "the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing
an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
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of antitrust analysis is not to decide whether a certain policy is in the public's
best interest or even in the best interest of the members of an industry.29 s
Rather, the court's purpose in antitrust cases is to determine whether the
competitive restraint hinders economic competition, in the sense that it
unreasonably prevents members of the industry from competing.2 99
The BCS might not be in the best interest of Division I-A universities because
the BCS creates a class system in college football, more aptly referred to as the
"haves" and "have-nots" of college football. Moreover, the BCS might not be
in the best interest of the public because the public might rather have the
excitement generated by a playoff structure, where Cinderellas can live their
dreams, and anyone can win at the end of the day. But the actions of the BCS
do not support an antitrust lawsuit. The purpose of the Sherman Act clearly
reveals that the Act focuses on competition, not individual competitors.
Unfortunately, for critics who would like to see the BCS system destroyed, the
Sherman Act will not provide that remedy.
C. Distinguishing Economic and Athletic Competition Under the Sherman
Act
Non-BCS universities' claim that the BCS is fraught with antitrust violations
"confuse[s] economic competition ... with athletic competition that is staged
for purposes of entertainment. '"" The BCS is athletic competition staged for
the purpose of entertaining college football consumers. Courts have
distinguished between athletic competition and economic competition on several
occasions. For example, in Baseball at Trotwood, LLC v. Dayton Professional
Baseball Club,3"' the plaintiffs were seeking to join the league, rather than to
compete with the league in an economic sense.302 The court found that other
courts have held that sports leagues do not violate federal antitrust laws simply
by declining to admit a prospective new member. 3 Distinguishing athletic and
social institutions." The court is not allowed to determine whether competition
is the wisest policy in any given industry, because Congress has determined that
free and open competition shall be the rule of commerce in our nation. Arguments
describing the ruinous effect of competition in a particular industry are to be
addressed to Congress, not to courts.
Bd. of Regents 1, 546 F. Supp. at 1304 (emphasis added) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
298. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
299. Id.
300. Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
301. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
302. Id. at 1172.




economic competition, the Trotwood court held that the plaintiffs did not suffer
antitrust injury by the league's refused admission because the refused
admittance did not reduce economic competition between members of the
league. 4
Similar to the plaintiffs in Trotwood, the non-BCS schools want to join the
BCS so that they may reap the full benefits of BCS bowl games. Under
Trotwood's reasoning, however, the BCS does not violate antitrust laws simply
because prospective members are denied entry. Non-BCS schools' claims
ultimately confuse economic competition, which is what the Sherman Act
protects, with athletic competition, whose winners are chosen on the playing
field.
VI. Conclusion
John Heisman once said: "When in doubt, punt!" Advocates of an antitrust
lawsuit against the BCS should wholeheartedly take Heisman' s advice and punt
on pursuing a lawsuit against the BCS. If non-BCS schools are seeking to
improve competition on the football field, an antitrust lawsuit is the wrong game
plan.
Few would deny that the BCS has serious problems and limitations.
However, the inequities of the BCS do not equate to a successful lawsuit under
the Sherman Act. Although the Sherman Act will not provide a legal remedy to
non-BCS schools, not all is lost in their effort to capture national attention.
With press coverage, congressional hearings, and law review articles, the
BCS remains an important topic. Such attention has created contempt for this
inequitable system and should fuel the fire under non-BCS schools. Although
the courtroom does not provide the proper setting for resolving this dispute,
several options exist for non-BCS schools - from further negotiations with the
BCS and the NCAA, to congressional leveling of the Division I-A college
football playing field.
This comment does not seek to determine whether the best solution for the
BCS is adding another bowl game or transitioning the bowl game postseason
into a playoff system. Rather, in punting on the antitrust lawsuit, non-BCS
schools should stay in the game and tackle this unique opportunity by
negotiating and changing the system that has caused so much controversy.
Jodi M. Warmbrod
304. Id. at 1172.
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